

## *The Final Counterattack*

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According to an operational directive issued by Eighth Army late on 15 August, the 24th Division was to remain on the defensive until 17 August, when it would unleash a massive counterattack with the aid of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. The intervening day would be devoted to planning the operation and coordinating the support of U.S. Air Force elements. It would also permit the Marines to reach their assigned sector. Rather than a day of rest and preparation, however, 16 August proved to be another day of heavy combat. Unwilling to relinquish the initiative it had seized earlier, the North Korean 4th Division resumed its own attack before dawn. Out of the darkness poured hundreds of screaming North Koreans who advanced behind a shower of hand grenades. The attack rippled across the front of Task Force Hill in waves, from the 34th Infantry's position on the left, through the 9th Infantry's sector in the center, all the way to the 19th Infantry's foxholes overlooking the Naktong. On the flanks, Task Force Hill lost ground, but its center held firm.<sup>1</sup>

Since the task force's left flank, consisting of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, and the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, was refused, only the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, faced the North Korean positions on the southern end of Obong-ni Ridge. There, Companies B and C were dug in on Hill 91, about 1,000 yards east of Obong-ni. Around 0430, North Korean units, supported by heavy automatic weapons and a self-propelled 76-mm gun, assaulted the hill. After a thirty-minute firefight, the two companies of the 34th were forced to abandon their positions and leave Hill 91 to the enemy. Behind them, the nearest high ground lay a mile distant across a valley filled with marshes and rice paddies. Under cover of artillery fire from the 13th Field Artillery Battalion, the companies withdrew across the valley. When they passed the position of the artillery's forward observer, he destroyed his radio and joined the retreat. With its left flank now open, Company A, to the north, also fell back into the valley. Eventually, the companies all gained the high ground a mile northeast of their original positions, and there the battalion reorganized itself after daylight (see map 16).<sup>2</sup>

At the other end of Task Force Hill's line, another North Korean attack also gained ground. For several days, the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, had held the southern tips of several ridges near the Naktong that faced the

North Korean positions on Ohang Hill. Companies E and F, much reduced in strength, together defended the ridge nearest the river, while Company G was on a separate ridge across a narrow valley to the southeast. In this sector, the North Korean attack was preceded by artillery and mortar fire, which Companies E and F first believed was an American barrage fired in error. At 0700, the North Korean infantry rushed forward and violently assaulted the ridge held by the two companies. Reporting the attack to regimental headquarters, the battalion commander requested permission to withdraw but received no answer. Gradually the remnants of the two companies were forced back by enemy pressure. As the morning progressed, they slowly withdrew northward along the ridgetop, making the North Koreans pay heavily for their gains. Shortly after noon, the battalion commander informed regimental headquarters: "Situation critical. E-F . . . cannot observe river, want more troops." Colonel Moore responded: "Doughboy [19th Infantry] will send I and R platoon. White [2d Battalion] must hold." With the aid of this small reinforcement, Companies E and F finally halted the enemy advance after losing 600 yards of the ridge. There, they reorganized and, at 1500, mounted a counterattack. Aided by the element of surprise, as well as by flanking fire from Company G, the two companies regained their old positions with surprising ease.<sup>3</sup>

In the center of Task Force Hill, the 9th Infantry sustained North Korean attacks all morning without giving up any ground. The attacks began before dawn on the positions held by the 2d Battalion on both sides of the Yongsan-Naktong road near the village of Tugok. Preceded by preparatory fires from artillery, mortars, and heavy automatic weapons, the attacks came in recognizable waves. During each attack, a group of North Koreans would stand fast, screaming, while others charged the American line. The North Koreans advanced fanatically, in a style reminiscent of many Japanese charges in World War II. As each successive assault was broken, the force behind the next attack lessened, until at last the enemy ceased to move forward. Artillery fire from the 15th Field Artillery Battalion contributed heavily to the repulse of the enemy from the 2d Battalion's positions. To the north, where the 1st Battalion clung to the slopes of Cloverleaf and Maekkok Hill, American artillery also raked the North Koreans as they assaulted throughout the morning. Advancing in broad daylight, the enemy broke into the positions of Company C on Cloverleaf and Company B on Maekkok. As Americans were hit, the North Koreans jumped into their fighting holes. In hand-to-hand fighting, they were driven out again and back down the slopes. To hasten their departure, the 9th Infantry called down air strikes upon them as they retreated. By noon, the North Korean will to continue attacking appeared to have been broken.<sup>4</sup>

In only one sector of the 24th Division's zone of responsibility did the North Koreans east of the Naktong remain on the defensive. Although it could have created serious difficulties for General Church, the 29th Infantry of the North Korean 10th Division continued to remain quiet in its bridgehead at Hill 409 near Hyonp'ung. Having been granted Eighth Army's permission to use the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, to deal with the enemy

incursion, General Church had ordered the battalion into the 21st Infantry's sector and placed it under the supervision of Colonel Stephens. The battalion arrived south of Hill 409 at 0430 and spent the morning moving into position for a company-size probe of the North Korean positions. After driving enemy outposts from the low ground south of the hill mass, the battalion prepared to send Company C forward. At 1400, a heavy air strike on Hill 409 triggered numerous secondary explosions. Under cover of this activity, Company C began its advance. Like the units of the 24th Division earlier in the campaign, Company C soon began to lose men from heat exhaustion. When it encountered an enemy force in a village at the foot of Hill 409, the company withdrew to its original position. In late afternoon, it advanced again, supported by several M-4 Sherman tanks from the regimental tank company. This probe also drew heavy enemy machine gun fire. With the day far spent and the North Koreans evincing no disposition to assume the offensive, Colonel Stephens suspended operations against Hill 409 until the following day. He was less than satisfied with the 1st Battalion's performance, especially its inability to coordinate supporting fires from available artillery and mortars.<sup>5</sup>

While his frontline units contained the North Korean assaults, General Church at Kyun'gyo presided over planning sessions for the 24th Division's coming counterattack. By early afternoon, the plan was complete and was published formally as Operations Directive Number One. As of 1400, Task Force Hill was abolished, with its components reverting to direct control of division headquarters. According to the plan, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade would relieve the 34th Infantry on the division's left flank late on 16 August. The 34th then would move northward behind the lines and relieve the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry. In turn, that unit would enter the sector held by the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry. All units would then prepare to advance at 0800 on 17 August in a coordinated counterattack. The advance would be preceded by a thirty-minute artillery and aerial bombardment.<sup>6</sup>

As developed by the division's staff, the plan called for the greatest effort to be made on the flanks of the North Korean penetration. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade's first task was to seize Obong-ni Ridge. Next, the brigade was to seize another hill mass to the southwest, then turn west across the Yongsan-Naktong road and assault a third hill mass in the center of the Bulge. The elimination of approximately half of the enemy salient was thus entrusted to the Marines. Their left flank, meanwhile, would be protected by the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, from its positions southwest of Yongsan. At the other end of the line, the 19th Infantry's mission was similar to that of the Marine brigade. It, too, was assigned three objectives. First was Ohang Hill, followed by two ridges deep within the North Korean lines. These last two objectives were to be seized in conjunction with the 34th Infantry. That unit would assist the 19th Infantry by fire during the attack on Ohang Hill, then join the advance toward the ridges that were Objectives 2 and 3. The final participant in the attack, the 9th Infantry, was assigned only one objective, the ridge west of the

village of Tugok. Once that objective was gained, the 9th Infantry would stand in place. If the situation permitted, it would then be withdrawn to become part of Eighth Army's reserve (see map 17).<sup>7</sup>

Obviously, the 24th Division's counterattack plan depended heavily upon the influx of relatively fresh reinforcements represented by the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. This unit, commanded by Brig. Gen. Edward Craig, was unlike any of the 24th Division's components in that it was a balanced ground-air team. The ground element of the brigade consisted of the 5th Marine Regiment (three battalions of infantry), augmented by an antitank company and an artillery battalion. The air element consisted of two squadrons of fighter-bombers (forty-eight aircraft), one squadron of night fighters (twelve aircraft), and an observation squadron (eight aircraft and four helicopters). Originally numbering over 6,300 officers and men, the Marine brigade had already seen action in the southern part of the Pusan Perimeter with the 25th Division. There, it had been heavily involved in the counterattack conducted by Task Force Kean beginning on 6 August. The brigade had left that operation on 13 August and had been in Eighth Army reserve since that time. Like the Army, the Marines had gone to war only half prepared. Each of the 5th Infantry's battalions contained only two rifle companies, and the entire brigade lacked much of its organic transportation. The tank company was armed with the modern M-26 Pershing tank, but the only experience the crews had with that weapon had been gained in the operation just concluded.<sup>8</sup>

On 16 August, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was located in an assembly area at Miryang, having moved from the south by road and rail. During the day, officers from the 5th Marine Regiment went forward to reconnoiter the positions of the 34th Infantry and Company F, 9th Infantry. Lying on the south side of the Yongsan-Naktong road, these positions were crucial to holding the route back to Yongsan. During the planning conference at Kyun'gyo, General Church emphasized this fact to General Craig, who incorporated it into his own plan for the following day. While meeting with Church, Craig also requested the loan of 144 trucks to transport his infantry from Miryang to the vicinity of Yongsan. This movement was scheduled to begin at 1600. Meanwhile, the air support section of the Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron met with the air section of the 24th Division to devise a plan for controlling air support for the coming counterattack. Since organic Marine air assets heavily outnumbered those released to the 24th Division by Eighth Army, it was agreed that the Marines would control all aircraft in the sector.<sup>9</sup>

According to General Craig's plan, the three infantry battalions of the 5th Marine Regiment were scheduled to depart Miryang by truck at 1600 on 16 August. When the 539th Truck Company arrived three hours late, however, it consisted of only 43 trucks, instead of the 144 requested by the Marines. By scavenging vehicles from various support elements, the 24th Division provided an additional 29 trucks, but the total was still insufficient to move the brigade on schedule in one lift. An improvised shuttle system was placed in operation after nightfall, but this had transported only two



Brig. Gen. Edward Craig, U.S. Marine Corps, and Maj. Gen. John H. Church, U.S. Army, in conference

battalions to Yongsan by midnight. The delay in moving the Marines forward meant that their relief of the 34th Infantry would also be delayed. In turn, the 34th would be delayed in relieving the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry. The counterattack had not even begun, and already the plan was beginning to unravel.<sup>10</sup>

Not long after midnight on the night of 16–17 August, Lt. Col. Robert Taplett's 3d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, began to arrive in the vicinity of the positions held by the 34th Infantry. Company G relieved the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, on high ground about a mile south of the Yongsan-Naktong road, while Company H relieved the 34th's 1st Battalion from its ridgetop location behind the 9th Infantry. General Church had specifically instructed General Craig to occupy these positions in order to protect the road to Yongsan. An additional reason, in Craig's mind, for holding this ground was his belief that the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, was too far away to safeguard the left flank of the Marine brigade. Thus, Craig elected to use one-third of his striking force to protect his flank and rear. At 0400, Taplett's battalion was in position, and the two battalions of the 34th Infantry moved to the rear. By now, they were several hours behind schedule, and H-hour was only four hours away.<sup>11</sup>

Following Taplett's men was Lt. Col. Harold Roise's 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment. Although scheduled to be the leading assault elements, Roise's troops had to walk most of the way from Yongsan because of the shortage of trucks. Wary from their night march, they were nevertheless able to reach their start positions and relieve Company F, 9th Infantry, which moved northward across the road and prepared to lead its parent 2d Battalion in the 9th's attack. As for Lt. Col. George Newton's 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, it was still in Miryang awaiting transportation. Its trucks did not arrive until 0615, and it did not reach the front until midmorning.<sup>12</sup>

The first objective assigned to Col. Raymond Murray's 5th Marine Regiment was Obong-ni Ridge. Gradually curving southeast from the Yongsan-Naktong road for a mile, the ridge had at least six identifiable knobs. From north to south, these were Hills 102, 109, 117, 143, 147, and 153. The ridge had long been used by the North Koreans to cover their movements to the southeast, and aerial observers had noticed North Koreans entrenching on the ridge as early as 13 August. Some of this information was available to Marine planners, but apparently little or none of it reached battalion level. Colonel Murray, in fact, believed that Obong-ni was not the enemy's main defensive position, a distinction he reserved for Hill 207, the Marine brigade's second objective. Thus, he considered Obong-ni to be the optimum line of departure for what he thought would be the much harder fight for Hill 207 (see maps 17 and 18).<sup>13</sup>

During his reconnaissance of the North Korean positions on the previous day, Colonel Murray had noted that the objective assigned to the 9th Infantry north of the road lay farther west than Obong-ni Ridge. Colonel Hill's regiment was scheduled to move forward at the same time as the Marines and seize the high ground west of the village of Tugok. Tugok itself lay in a depression directly north of the tip of Obong-ni. Believing that Obong-ni was lightly defended, Murray reasoned that the advance would proceed more smoothly if the Marines seized the ridge before Hill's 9th Infantry began its attack. Although Hill claimed that his troops were in good shape and "hot to go," Murray held a different opinion from his personal observation of the 9th Infantry, and this may have influenced his subsequent actions. In a meeting with Hill, Murray suggested that the Marines make their assault first, and Hill accepted the idea. The original plan, which had called for a simultaneous advance, was thus modified by the two regimental commanders. General Craig was not informed of the change, but apparently General Church was notified. Deferring to his field commanders, Church reluctantly gave his approval.<sup>14</sup>

Having been permitted to fight the battle his own way, Murray made his attack plan. Since Obong-ni's southern end was the highest part of the ridge and the terrain south of it was extremely rough, Murray elected to make a frontal assault on Obong-ni's northern half. The attack would be made in column of battalions, with the 2d Battalion in the lead, the 1st Battalion in the second line when it arrived, and the 3d Battalion guarding the left and rear. A platoon of four tanks from Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, would provide fire support with their 90-mm main guns. Also in support were the mortars of the 2d Battalion's Weapons Company and the three batteries of 105-mm howitzers belonging to the 1st Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment. The artillery had been in place since late on the previous day and had already fired a few rounds for registration purposes. Air strikes were to be available as needed. By 0730, everything was in place except for the 1st Battalion, which was still en route from Miryang.<sup>15</sup>

At 0730, a short artillery preparation began on schedule. It ended at 0735, so that aircraft could strike Obong-ni. Five minutes later, eighteen Marine F4U Corsairs appeared and blasted the target with napalm and

1,000-pound bombs. From a distance, the effect appeared to be devastating, but later events would prove that the North Korean defenders, deeply entrenched on the reverse slope, had not been badly hurt. Once the planes had finished their runs, the artillery was scheduled to fire a ten-minute bombardment. It did so, but either through poor registration or mistakes by the forward observers, few rounds, if any, fell on Obong-ni. Thus, the North Koreans gained an opportunity to recover before the 2d Battalion crossed the line of departure at 0800.<sup>16</sup>

Roise's battalion moved to the attack with Company D on the right and Company E on the left. Company E headed first for Obong-ni village, nestled at the foot of the ridge below the knobs numbered 117 and 143. Delayed by enemy outposts in the village, it fell behind Company D. That unit crossed the Yongsan-Naktong road and began to ascend the slopes leading to knobs 102 and 109. Company D advanced initially with two platoons in line, while a third remained in reserve at the line of departure. At first, the platoons encountered little difficulty, but as they moved higher up the slope, they were assailed by fire from above and on both flanks. The flanking fire from the left dissipated somewhat when Company E began its own climb up the ridge, but the fire from the right flank raked the Marines mercilessly. Most of it came from the village of Tugok, which remained in North Korean hands because of the preassault agreement between Murray and Hill. Even after the reserve platoon was committed, Company D was unable to gain a secure foothold on the top of Obong-ni, although some of its men reached the crest several times. Farther south, Company E experienced similar difficulties and stalled two-thirds of the way up the ridge (see map 18).<sup>17</sup>

The situation called for supporting arms to aid in breaking the impasse, but all efforts to employ them failed. Company E lost touch with its mortars and Company D's mortars were unable to drive the North Korean machine gunners from Tugok. Similarly, the Marine artillery proved unable to assist the infantrymen. The forward observer with Company E was unable to make contact with his assigned artillery battery. Company D's forward observer requested a fire mission on Tugok, and it was begun. Someone quickly noticed, however, that the target lay in the sector of the 9th Infantry, and the mission was aborted before it could do any good. Through either a procedural or communications lapse, the 24th Division's artillery did not pick up the mission and remained silent. Only the platoon of tanks added their fire to that of the 2d Battalion, and they were forced to concentrate on enemy antitank gunners on Obong-ni. The four tanks were hit by a total of twenty-three rounds of antitank rifle fire, but none penetrated their armor. Although the tanks materially aided the infantry in suppressing the fire from Obong-ni, they were unable to strike the North Koreans in Tugok because of intervening hills. None of the aircraft circling overhead hit Tugok either, being directed instead to targets both south and west of Obong-ni.<sup>18</sup>

By late morning, it was clear that the 2d Battalion could go no farther without assistance. Both companies pulled back slightly, so that an air



M-26 tank preparing to fire in support of the Marine attack on Obong-ni Ridge

strike could hit the North Koreans on the crest of Obong-ni. The strike was ineffective. Only two napalm bombs were dropped: one landed on another ridge, and the second failed to ignite. Companies D and E then resumed their efforts to seize the crest of the ridge, but success still eluded them. By noon, the battalion had lost 23 killed and 119 wounded, including 5 officers. Several platoons had been reduced to no more than 15 men each. These heavy losses only intensified General Craig's concern about the lack of progress in both his own sector and that of the adjoining 9th Infantry. Upon conferring with Murray, he learned for the first time the cause of the 9th Infantry's inactivity. Concluding that his original analysis of the tactical situation had been in error, Murray attempted to contact Colonel Hill in an effort to get some relief from the vicious flanking fire emanating from Tugok. Maddeningly, now that he wanted the 9th Infantry to advance, communications difficulties kept Murray from reaching Hill immediately. With no other recourse, he decided to commit his 1st Battalion to the attack.<sup>19</sup>


Lieutenant Colonel Newton's 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, had finally arrived from Miryang by midmorning. At 1245, Colonel Murray ordered Newton to pass through the battered 2d Battalion's positions and continue the assault. Newton received Murray's order at 1330 and quickly moved his men forward. Establishing his CP with that of Roise, at 1500 he sent Companies A and B across the valley and up the ridge. While the mortars and machine guns of Weapons Company provided covering fire in concert with the tanks on the road, the two companies of the 1st Battalion climbed the steep slopes. Soon they passed through the depleted ranks of the 2d Battalion and continued toward the knobs that comprised the crest

of Obong-ni. Finally, at 1710, the 1st Platoon of Company B gained Hill 102. Not long thereafter, the 1st Platoon of Company A stormed onto Hill 117, two knobs to the south. Unable to push along the ridge southward toward Hill 143 because of heavy North Korean fire, the platoon soon was forced to withdraw from the top of 117 itself. Efforts by Company A's 2d Platoon to gain Hill 143 were also unsuccessful. Company B, however, was able to secure Hill 109 to the north. Thus, by nightfall, the Marines held the two northernmost knobs of Obong-ni, Hills 102 and 109. From there, the Marine lines ran down the slope of Hill 117 toward the original line of departure (see map 18).<sup>20</sup>

North of the road, Colonel Hill's 9th Infantry finally launched its own attack around 1300. Led by Companies F and G, the 2d Battalion slowly worked its way toward Tugok. In a fight that lasted all afternoon, the battalion gradually cleared the village and assaulted the ridge beyond. Several attacks were thrown back, but just before nightfall, the two companies gained the ridge crest and were not pushed off again. Like the Marines, they dug in for the night on the ground gained, while Company E occupied a reserve position at the original line of departure. To the north, the 1st Battalion remained in the positions it had held for several days. With its single objective secured, the 9th Infantry had concluded successfully its part of the operation. Although some facts remain obscure, available evidence suggests that if the regiment had made its assault in conjunction with the attack of the Marines, both units could have achieved their objectives more rapidly and at a lower cost.<sup>21</sup>

Around 2000, while both the Marines and the 2d Battalion, 9th Infantry, were preparing defensive positions for the night, the North Koreans mounted a counterattack straight down the road that curved around the north end of Obong-ni. Three T-34 tanks led the attack, followed by a fourth some distance behind with infantry support. From their position high on Obong-ni, Marines of Company B saw them coming and sounded the alarm. As the leading tanks clanked slowly down the road, Marines from the regimental antitank company hastily prepared an ambush by positioning 3.5-inch rocket launchers and 75-mm recoilless rifles around a curve in the road. The Marine tank platoon, which had gone to the rear to rearm and refuel, was also called back to the front. The Pershings were momentarily delayed by several trucks that had been abandoned in the road by their drivers, but the tankers drove the trucks aside and continued forward. They arrived just as the first T-34 rounded the curve in the road.<sup>22</sup>

As the leading North Korean tank passed through the ambush zone, it was hit first by a 3.5-inch rocket but continued to advance. Several 75-mm projectiles from the recoilless rifles brought it to a halt, just as the leading Marine tank appeared and fired at a range of 100 yards. The T-34 burst into flames. Behind it, the second North Korean tank also took hits from the rocket launchers and recoilless rifles, one of which broke a track. The tank slewed off the road to the right and went into a ditch. Like the first T-34, it continued to fire its gun even though it was immobilized. A second M-26 Pershing now joined the first. Aligned hub to hub in the narrow road,



Three North Korean T-34 tanks destroyed in the First Battle of the Naktong Bulge. The northern tip of Obong-ni Ridge is in the background.

assembly area about 500 yards behind the 3d Battalion, and both units prepared to participate in the counterattack. The plan called for the 34th Infantry to support by fire the assault of the 19th Infantry on Ohang Hill, then to proceed on its own to Objectives 2 and 3. Thus, until the 19th Infantry jumped off, the 34th remained inactive.<sup>24</sup>

Colonel Moore of the 19th Infantry anticipated that his 1st Battalion could reach its line of departure in a relatively short time, but this proved not to be the case. Taking a roundabout route through the tangle of hills behind the front lines, the exhausted men of the 1st Battalion fell further and further behind schedule. Their progress was marked by a succession of messages announcing postponement of the time for assault. The 1st Battalion did not arrive at its assembly area behind the 2d Battalion's position until 1330, and only then did preparations for the assault begin. While waiting, the 2d Battalion conducted patrols toward the North Korean positions on Ohang Hill. These patrols found the enemy still present in force. Finally, the 1st Battalion's assault was scheduled for 1700. Several attempts were made to arrange an air strike on Ohang Hill just before the attack, but no aircraft were available at that hour. Fire support was provided by several artillery batteries, the regimental Heavy Mortar Company, and the 1st Battalion's own Weapons Company. Precisely at 1700, the battalion crossed the line of departure, with Company B on the right, Company C on the left, and Company A in reserve (see map 19).<sup>25</sup>

While the heavy machine guns of Weapons Company played back and forth across the crest of Ohang Hill, Company B's 117 officers and men left the safety of their own positions, crossed the intervening valley, and began to climb the slopes of their objective. The 1st Platoon was on the left, with the 2d Platoon on its right, while the 3d Platoon trailed the 2d as company reserve. When the platoons climbed high enough to mask their own supporting weapons, the North Koreans opened a withering fire upon the struggling infantrymen. The 1st Platoon was immediately pinned down, and the 2d Platoon was halted as well. Rather than allow the attack to stall, a sergeant from the 2d Platoon charged forward alone and knocked out an enemy machine gun position on the crest. He then called his squad to the top of the hill. Even though the rest of the platoon maneuvered to the right, it remained pinned down and was unable to join the handful of men on the crest. When the 3d Platoon moved up between the other two, it also was halted by the wall of fire. Again, one man took action to break the impasse. The company commander ordered the 3d Platoon to pull back, maneuver to the left, and reinforce the 1st Platoon's push. Energized by this assistance, the 1st Platoon finally forced its way to the crest. After driving back an enemy counterattack, the 1st and 3d Platoons wiped out the North Korean machine gunners holding up the 2d Platoon, and that platoon joined them on the crest.<sup>26</sup>

On the southern end of Ohang Hill, Company C, 144 strong, experienced similar difficulties in gaining the top of the ridge. Forced to keep their heads down because of the covering fire, the North Koreans leaped into action once the machine guns of Weapons Company were masked by their

own infantry. The 1st Platoon on the left and part of the 3d Platoon on the right were pinned down by the galling automatic weapons fire and the showers of hand grenades that rained down upon them. The part of the 3d Platoon that was not under direct fire moved laterally to the right, and two of its men crawled to the crest. Finding only a lone machine gun crew nearby, they destroyed it. The diminution of enemy fire allowed the rest of the company to gain the top of the hill. Unwilling to surrender the high ground without further struggle, the North Koreans counterattacked with twenty men. They were easily repulsed. As night fell, Company C tied in with Company B on the right and the sixty-five men of Company A, which had come up on their left. After enduring an hour-long barrage of shells from North Korean 120-mm mortars, they settled in for the night on their newly won ground. Even then, the North Koreans were not finished and counterattacked after dark with 100 men. When this assault, too, was thrown back, quiet finally descended on Ohang Hill.<sup>27</sup>

While most of the day's fighting occurred in the Naktong Bulge, other elements of the 24th Division encountered the enemy as well. Both the 21st Infantry and the 3d Engineer (C) Battalion engaged North Korean patrols with fire before dawn. Several units reported small enemy groups roaming throughout the division's rear, one of which attacked a medical detachment of the 21st Infantry. This group of infiltrators was driven into the hills by the regimental I and R Platoon and South Korean police but was not destroyed. Around Hill 409, the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, continued to probe the positions held by the North Korean 29th Regiment. Supported by air strikes and artillery fire, Company A cautiously explored the eastern approaches to the towering hill mass. The enemy responded vigorously with small arms, machine guns, and light mortars but employed no heavier weapons. A prisoner captured in the area reported that his unit suffered from a lack of ammunition, thus providing a possible explanation for the strange behavior of the North Korean regiment on Hill 409.<sup>28</sup>

The results of the day's counterattack, while less favorable than expected, nevertheless were gratifying to General Church. The initial objectives of the Marines, the 9th Infantry, and the 19th Infantry had all been achieved, with gains of approximately 1,000 yards in each sector (see map 20). Marine casualties had been heavy, the 2d Battalion alone losing 142 men. In contrast, the 9th Infantry lost 73 men, while the 19th Infantry suffered only 10 casualties.<sup>29</sup> As had so often been the case, the coordinated movements so carefully written into the plan had not been achieved. Instead, the attack had occurred in sequential order across the front of the Bulge. There had also been communications problems, since the heavy Marine tanks had inadvertently cut the wires leading back to the division headquarters at Kyun'gyo during their move to the front. This problem had not proved insurmountable, however, since an advance division command post had been established earlier at Yongsan. Other difficulties had been discovered in the air strike control arrangements, and several ground units had been mistakenly attacked by friendly aircraft. Fortunately, no serious damage had been done. Given the fact that ground units from two Army

divisions and a Marine brigade were supported by both Air Force and Marine strike aircraft in the same zone of operations, the degree of coordination actually achieved could be considered satisfactory, if not remarkable. Although the disparate elements of his team were not yet working in complete harmony, Church believed the North Korean 4th Division had finally lost the initiative. Accordingly, he ordered that the counterattack be resumed at first light on 18 August.<sup>30</sup>

Unwilling to surrender the initiative totally to their opponents, the North Koreans mounted a series of limited counterattacks during the hours of darkness. These attacks centered on the ground gained earlier by the Americans on both sides of the Yongsan-Naktong road. At 0335, Company F, 9th Infantry, repulsed an enemy thrust against its positions on the hill west of Tugok, but only after withdrawing about 100 yards. South of the road, on Obong-ni Ridge, another enemy counterattack rolled down from Hill 117 and split Company A of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment. Because of the circumstances of the previous day's battle, this company's defensive position was badly sited on the lower slopes of Hill 117 and in the saddle between it and the next knob to the north. When the North Koreans charged down the hill behind a curtain of bullets and grenades, they crashed through the center of the company and drove the company commander from his CP. The left and right platoons clung to their positions, but the shattered remnants of the center platoon were driven to the bottom of the ridge. Just when the Marines' situation appeared most hopeless, the enemy assault faltered and then receded. No attempt had been made to exploit Company A's open left flank or even to destroy its isolated left platoon. This unusual behavior led some observers to conclude that the North Korean attack was not a serious offensive movement but was only a ploy intended to cover a withdrawal.<sup>31</sup>

With the coming of dawn, Company A reorganized itself and began a new assault on Hill 117. This time, supporting fires were better coordinated than those of the previous day. Mortars and machine guns from the 1st Battalion's Weapons Company raked the crest, while Company B added its fire from Hill 109 to the north. When the North Korean resistance did not slacken, the commander of Company A called for an air strike. A lone Marine Corsair roared in and dropped a 500-pound bomb within seventy-five yards of the forward positions of the Marines. The tremendous blast destroyed several North Korean machine guns and crews, but the concussion unfortunately also killed a Marine. Limited as it was, this strike suppressed enemy resistance on Hill 117. When Company A resumed its assault, it easily gained the crest. The next knob to the south, Hill 143, now became the focal point of the North Korean defense. Under the combined blows of the 81-mm and 4.2-inch mortar sections and supplemented by another air strike, the North Korean defenses were smashed, and this peak also fell to Company A. Hills 147 and 153 to the south next received similar treatment from the Marines' supporting arms. By 0900, Company A was securely in possession of Hills 117 and 143, with the North Korean defenders in full view retreating across the valley to the hills beyond. As

the morning progressed, Company A continued to advance southward on Obong-ni Ridge, mopping up small pockets of enemy resistance. Left behind on the ridge were 43 machine guns, 63 rifles and submachine guns, 8 anti-tank rifles, and 150 North Korean dead. When their own losses were tallied, Companies A and B of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, numbered only 216 officers and men (see map 21).<sup>32</sup>

Once it was clear that Obong-ni was securely in Marine hands, Colonel Murray ordered his 3d Battalion to move forward from its reserve position and to prepare to assault Marine Objective 2, Hill 207. At 0945, Lieutenant Colonel Taplett passed his troops through the 1st Battalion and began the attack. Supported by a platoon of Marine tanks, Company H crossed the valley and started the climb to the crest. Initially following behind H, Company G soon swerved to the right and came into line beside it. Ahead of the two companies, the objective erupted in fire and smoke from the pounding of hundreds of artillery, mortar, and tank rounds. Overhead, Marine tactical air coordinators directed Corsairs against both Hill 207 and the surrounding area. When forty North Koreans attempted to outflank the companies toiling up the slope, the Marine Pershings opened fire on them from a distance of 300 yards and shattered the counterattack. Under cover of this pounding attack, the Marine infantry made rapid progress. Company H gained the summit of Hill 207 by 1130, and Company G joined it an hour later.<sup>33</sup>

Driven from the high ground, North Korean soldiers in large numbers fled toward the rear. As they crossed the valley containing the Yongsan-Naktong road, they made perfect targets for the Marine tanks. The Pershings fired continuously for several hours with their main guns, .50-caliber machine guns, and .30-caliber machine guns. Some North Koreans ran down the road toward the Naktong, while others climbed Hill 311 in hopes of making a stand. Many were so panic stricken that they threw away their weapons and equipment in their mad dash to safety. They were spurred on not only by the tanks but also by artillery fire and air strikes mercilessly called down upon them by both aerial and ground observers. The North Koreans, who had fought so tenaciously as late as the previous day, now seemed to have lost all cohesion and most of their will to resist.<sup>34</sup>

While the Marines were wresting Obong-ni Ridge and Hill 207 from the North Koreans, the units of the 24th Division made similar progress north of the Yongsan-Naktong road. The two battalions of the 9th Infantry immediately north of the Marines had no assigned objective on 18 August, since they were due to be "pinched out" by the units advancing on both flanks. Nevertheless, they supported adjacent units with fire. North of the 9th, the 34th and 19th Infantry regiments intended to make a coordinated attack on Hill 240, but like so many of the 24th Division's previous attacks, this one, too, went awry. Beauchamp's 34th Infantry moved forward on schedule, but Moore's 19th Infantry, on the right, did not immediately join it. By now located several thousand yards from the nearest road, the 1st Battalion of the 19th had great difficulty in transporting a fresh stock of ammunition forward to its assault companies on Ohang Hill. This back-

breaking but essential task was not completed until some time after daylight, and the 19th's attack was delayed accordingly.<sup>35</sup>

At 0630, Companies K and L of the 3d Battalion, 34th Infantry, crossed the line of departure and headed downhill into the valley separating them from their objective, the left end of a high ridge running northwest 2,500 yards toward the Naktong. The immediate goal of the 3d Battalion was Hill 240, the highest point on the ridge, while the 19th Infantry had responsibility for the rest of the ridge and a nearby peak, Hill 223. With Company K on the left and Company L on the right, the 3d Battalion initially made good progress against moderate to light resistance. The battalion's third company, I, was not available for support, since it remained detached, guarding the Naktong shore north of the 19th Infantry. Support initially seemed unnecessary, since both assault companies reached their assigned sectors of the ridge crest without difficulty around 0800. Suddenly, however, Company L was struck by a heavy counterattack on its front and open right flank. Hit from an unexpected direction (the sector that should have been covered by the tardy 19th Infantry), Company L was thrown back down the ridge several hundred yards. The unit sustained more than twenty casualties in only a few minutes. At 0920, Colonel Beauchamp was told: "L company is cut up bad—do not think they will be able to do anything. . . . They are picking L Co. off like flies."<sup>36</sup>

Company K made an effort to relieve the pressure on Company L, but the primary assistance could only come from the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry. This unit finally began its own assault just as Company L withdrew from Hill 240. Moving slowly down from Ohang Hill and across the valley, Companies A and C initially suffered little from the North Korean fire, which continued to beat upon the hapless Company L. Covered by the base of fire provided by Company B from Ohang Hill, the 1st Battalion's assault companies began to struggle up the steep slope of Hill 240. By 1000 hours, they were one-third of the way to the top and nearly abreast of Company L, which was now being pounded by mortar fire. Continuing their climb, the sixty-one men of Company A scrambled to the top of the ridge with little opposition. Nearer the river, Company C encountered stiffer resistance, as heavy automatic weapons fire briefly halted the two leading platoons. A sergeant who charged forward with a .30-caliber machine gun finally broke the deadlock, and Company C surged to the top of the hill. By 1145, the 1st Battalion's two assault companies securely held their portion of the ridge. To their left, the badly mauled Company L, 34th Infantry, rejoined Company K on Hill 240. By noon, Objective 2 was in American hands, and troops on Hill 240 could see masses of North Korean soldiers fleeing toward the river. Just as in the Marines' sector, both artillery fire and air strikes took a heavy toll as the North Koreans withdrew (see map 21).<sup>37</sup>

During the afternoon, General Church's leading elements paused to regroup, resupply, and pass fresh units to the front before resuming the drive to completely erase the North Korean bridgehead east of the Naktong. South of the Yongsan-Naktong road the 2d and 3d Battalions, 5th Marines, continued to mop up scattered resistance on Hill 207, while Marine tanks



Marines on top of Hill 311, with the valley of the Nakdong in the distance

pounded their final objective, Hill 311, north of the road. In the 34th Infantry's zone, Colonel Beauchamp positioned his 1st Battalion to assault the regiment's Objective 3, a series of slightly lower crests west of Hill 240. Similarly, Colonel Moore's 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, began to displace forward to serve as the 19th's spearhead in the afternoon advance. Moore also requested an airdrop of rations, water, and ammunition for the troops of the 1st Battalion. Sadly, the number of individual rations required was only 300.<sup>38</sup>

Shortly after 1500, the American advance toward the banks of the Nakdong resumed. Each unit now moved independently of its neighbors. Previously, such a lack of coordination had caused difficulties, but by now the North Korean 4th Division had become so fragmented that no main line of resistance could be identified. Once again, the Marines were first to jump off. Companies G and H of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, crossed the Yongsan-Nakdong road at 1535 and slowly began to work their way up the lower slopes of the towering Hill 311. As the infantry inched forward, massive supporting fires devastated the crest far above them. Unlike the previous day's experience at Obong-ni Ridge, the Marines were now able to orchestrate a coordinated bombardment by mortars, recoilless rifles, tanks, artillery, and aircraft. Assisted by this awesome display of firepower, Company G gained the left half of Hill 311 at 1725 and easily secured its sector fifteen minutes later. On its right, Company H had a more difficult time. At 1825, the company was pinned down by automatic weapons fire from

an estimated twenty North Koreans on the eastern end of the hill. All efforts to eliminate this pocket by nightfall were unsuccessful. Rather than blunder about in the darkness, the Marines resolved to wait until the following morning to conclude their mopping-up operations.<sup>39</sup>

Fifteen hundred yards north of Hill 311, the 34th and 19th Infantry regiments began their assaults on their own final objectives some time after the Marines. Late in the afternoon, Companies A and B of the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, passed through the positions of the 3d Battalion on Hill 240 on their way to Objective 3. Company C, now numbering only thirty-seven men, remained behind. The assault companies arrived at the objective by 1840 but then encountered several pockets of stubborn enemy resistance that prevented them from securing the position until after dark. North of them, the 19th Infantry was again late in crossing its line of departure. The 2d Battalion did not even begin its advance until Beauchamp's men were already on top of their half of the objective. By the time the 2d Battalion reached Objective 3, it had been dark for over an hour (see map 21).<sup>40</sup>

By the end of 18 August, most of the North Korean bridgehead had been eliminated. Everywhere, the enemy was in frantic retreat. The hills were littered with discarded weapons and equipment. Before darkness, both aerial and ground observers reported hundreds of North Korean soldiers gathering at various points along the river bank in hopes of getting across to safety. Artillery fire and air strikes were directed upon them until darkness put an end to the slaughter. According to the division's war diary, 18 August was "by far the most successful day of combat for the 24th Division in the Korean War." Only in the division's northern sector was there any cause for concern. There, the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, had continued its series of probes against the North Korean regiment on Hill 409. In the process, its Company B had run into heavy opposition and had suffered sixteen casualties. Yet even there, the enemy displayed no inclination to act offensively.<sup>41</sup>


During the night, while artillery interdicted known crossing points, the 24th Division staff planned a series of movements designed to complete the reconquest of the Naktong Bulge on the following day. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was ordered to secure Hill 311, patrol to the river, then assemble behind the Bulge as division reserve. After the 34th and 19th Infantry regiments consolidated their own final objectives, they, too, were to advance to the Naktong and prepare to defend their assigned zones. The 9th Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, meanwhile would sweep through the rough terrain south of the Marine sector and secure the lower part of the Bulge from Namji-ri to the tip of the salient. North of the Bulge, the 21st Infantry, the 3d Engineer (C) Battalion, and the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry, were all to hold their original defensive positions while closely watching the North Korean regiment on Hill 409. The 24th Recon Company would continue to provide security for the division's rear areas.<sup>42</sup>

At 0617 on 19 August, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, launched the 24th Division's final assault on the North Korean 4th Division's shrinking posi-

tion east of the Nakdong River. Within an hour, the Marines had secured the remainder of Hill 311, which overlooked the river. At 0845, Marine patrols made contact with elements of the 34th Infantry on their right. Throughout the morning, both Marine and Army patrols combed the foothills leading down to the Nakdong. Everywhere they found evidence of the enemy's hasty flight to safety. Small arms, equipment, and even documents were scattered over the hills and gullies. On a little knoll just off the Yongsan-Nakdong road near the river, the Marines found a large artillery park. They tallied nine undamaged crew-served weapons in the immediate area, including 76-mm guns, U.S. 105-mm howitzers, and Soviet 122-mm howitzers. These and other artillery pieces found elsewhere in the Bulge were gathered in an assembly area near Yongsan. Three of the guns were American howitzers captured earlier in the war or in the initial North Korean assault on 6 August. As for small arms, three truckloads were collected from the battlefield in the Marines' sector alone.<sup>43</sup>

By late afternoon, the mopping-up process was virtually finished. In the northern sector of the Bulge, both the 34th and 19th Infantry regiments completed their sweeps through the hills to the river bank, as did the Marines at the center of the salient. To the south, the troops of the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry, and 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, tramped through similar terrain, gathering North Korean stragglers and collecting discarded weapons and equipment. With their task done, the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 5th Marines, at 1600, boarded trucks that carried them to an assembly area near Yongsan. Around sunset, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, was relieved by elements of the 19th Infantry and moved to join the rest of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. The 19th Infantry occupied the southern half of the Bulge, while the 34th Infantry established defensive positions in the northern half. The 9th Infantry assembled in the afternoon near Yongsan as division reserve (see map 22).<sup>44</sup>

On 20 August, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade departed Yongsan en route to an Eighth Army reserve position at the southern end of the Pusan Perimeter. Two units of the 2d Division—the 9th Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry—remained with the 24th Division. During the day, an operational directive from Eighth Army announced that the 24th Division would be relieved by the 2d Division on the Nakdong line as soon as the remainder of the 2d Division arrived at the front. Planning for the change began immediately. On 22 August, the 38th Infantry of the 2d Division arrived and relieved the 21st Infantry and the 3d Engineer (C) Battalion. During the next two days, the 9th Infantry of the 2d Division occupied the defensive positions of both the 19th and 34th Infantry regiments. The opposing North Korean forces remained inactive during the changeover, although they retained their bridgehead in the vicinity of Hill 409. On 24 August, most elements of the 24th Division left the sector they had defended since early August and began their move northward to a reserve position near Kyongsan. There, on the next day, after fifty-five days of combat, the division began a much needed period of rest, refit, and rehabilitation.<sup>45</sup>



The 24th Division cemetery, Pusan Perimeter

Although the 24th Division had departed the Naktong Bulge forever, it left behind at least one tangible reminder of its victory and the cost associated with it. At the Miryang Experimental Farm, in the rear of the division's old sector, a cemetery had been established as a temporary resting place for American casualties of the fight. By 23 August, the cemetery contained 365 interments. On that date, a formal dedication ceremony was held, with a flag raising, rifle volleys, and taps played by a 2d Division bugler. Ironically, a photographer from the 24th Signal Company was barred from recording the ceremony because of the division quartermaster's earlier prohibition of photographs of American graves. Afterward, the cemetery, like the battlefield itself, was formally transferred into the keeping of the 2d Division.<sup>46</sup>


The Naktong Bulge remained quiet for only a week after the departure of the 24th Division. On the night of 31 August, a fresh North Korean division crossed into the Bulge and assaulted the positions thinly held by the 9th Infantry. At the same time, elements of two other North Korean divisions forded the Naktong in the northern part of the 2d Division's sector. In the south, the enemy penetrated as far as Yongsan and even gained control of the town briefly before being driven out. To the north, Ch'angnyong was threatened, but the 2d Division managed to retain possession. Once again, General Walker ordered the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to join the fight in the Naktong Bulge. Entering combat around Yongsan, the Marines advanced almost to Obong-ni Ridge before being withdrawn to prepare for the amphibious landing at Inchon. By itself, the depleted 2d Division proved unable to advance farther. In the First Battle of the Naktong Bulge, the 24th Division, with much assistance from other units, had restored its original front and claimed a victory over the North Korean 4th Division. Such would not be the case in the Second Battle of

the Naktong Bulge. There, the 2d Division was able to halt the North Korean attack, but it was unable to regain the river line. This time, the Bulge would not be free of North Korean forces until the final enemy retreat precipitated by the Inchon landing of 15 September 1950. Spearheading the breakout from the Pusan Perimeter that accompanied the landing was the now rejuvenated 24th Division.<sup>47</sup>

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## *Lessons of the Battle*

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The operations of the 24th Infantry Division on the Naktong River in August 1950 represent a case study of light infantry acting on the defensive in mountainous terrain. Although then-current tables of organization and equipment (TOE) called for an infantry division to be heavier than those of the World War II era, circumstances had reduced the division to a light infantry formation. Because of its peacetime organizational structure, the 24th Infantry Division had almost none of the armored components normally organic to an infantry division in 1950. Due to the rigors of its operations prior to 6 August, the division had lost much of its heavy equipment. The number of vehicles of all types, from prime movers to jeeps, was far below the total authorized in the TOE. The division's artillery component was greatly reduced as a result of both the peacetime practice of deleting one firing battery from each battalion and the wartime losses associated with forced retrograde movements. Thus, the 24th Infantry Division's fighting power was concentrated almost exclusively in its infantrymen and the relatively light weapons with which they were armed. Unfortunately, the twin processes of peacetime skeletonization and wartime attrition had taken their toll upon the division's infantry component as well. Thus, the 24th Infantry Division was not only light in equipment but also weak in numbers.<sup>1</sup>

The position assigned to the 24th Infantry Division for defense in early August provided many theoretical advantages. The Naktong River flowed directly in front of the division's defensive trace and, indeed, defined that trace. While the river served as something of a moat and an antitank ditch, it was more a hindrance to the crossing of infantry than an impassable obstacle. Nevertheless, its value to the defense was twofold. First, if the river bank could be held in strength, the attacker's assault problem would be complicated by the water barrier. Second, until a bridge or ferry system could be established, a successful initial assault could not be rapidly exploited because of the difficulty of moving heavy weapons and supplies across the river. Unfortunately for the 24th Division, the Naktong's sinuous twists and turns, especially in the Bulge area, greatly extended the river frontage to be defended. This factor, when coupled with the division's general weakness in combat personnel, served to negate the river line as a defensive advantage during the initial enemy assault.

In theory, the cluster of steep hills stretching eastward from the Naktong shoreline almost to Ch'angnyong and Yongsan gave the defense an additional advantage. Only two roads of consequence penetrated the hills eastward from the river. These provided relatively high-speed access to the division rear, but their small number did not unduly complicate the division's defensive arrangements. Much more important were the large areas of hills, ridges, gullies, and small valleys that characterized the terrain between the river and the lateral road connecting Ch'angnyong and Yongsan. Again, if sufficient numbers of troops had been available, these hills and ridges could have provided a succession of defensive positions to blunt and eventually halt any enemy attack in strength. Defense of such terrain, however, was unit intensive. While lines of sight were good from the hills nearest the river, elsewhere they were abysmal from all but the highest peaks. Back from the river, dead ground abounded. A unit on one hill could not cover territory in any way commensurate with the effective range of its weapons because its lines of sight were blocked by intervening hills and undulations of the ground. Several gullies and ravines penetrated almost every battalion-size defensive sector that could be established.

By the time the 24th Division reached the Pusan Perimeter in early August, Eighth Army's situation had momentarily stabilized. For the first time, the 24th Division's flanks were covered by other American units, although divisional sectors were so large that the presence of neighboring units prevented only the widest enemy enveloping maneuvers. Well aware of his unit's condition, terrain considerations, and his defensive mission, General Church adopted a defensive plan well suited to his situation. With three depleted American regiments and an ROK regiment at his disposal to guard a frontage of thirty-four miles, Church clearly saw that his forces were inadequate for a conventional positional defense along the Naktong shoreline. He therefore decided to outpost the river line lightly, while retaining relatively large reserves for the purpose of counterattacking enemy penetrations. The 34th and 21st Infantry regiments of the 24th Division and the 17th ROK Regiment each received a sector to defend. Since each of the American regiments had only two battalions, they were unable to deploy in the doctrinally approved and experience-tested formation of two battalions forward and one in reserve. Instead, the 34th and 21st Infantry regiments each placed one battalion in frontline positions overlooking the river and a second in the rear as a counterattack force. As a result, frontages of individual companies were enormous, the small number of men in each position being virtually swallowed up by the maze of hills and ravines. As a general reserve, to be used in case of a major enemy penetration, the 19th Infantry was held by Church in a central location near Ch'angnyong.

Church's defensive scheme was not intended to halt a North Korean attack at the water's edge. The wide frontage and the limited number of defenders precluded that option. Instead, any penetration would be dealt with by units in reserve, which would respond swiftly to the enemy thrust. The reserve battalions would blunt any small-scale breakthroughs, and the reserve regiment would repulse anything larger. The key to the 24th Divi-

sion's defensive plan, therefore, was counterattack. Doctrinally, Church's solution to the division's defensive problem was sound, adhering closely to the advice given in the 1949 edition of FM 100—5, *Operations*. In only one provision was the manual violated—the requirement that every effort be made to gain “early information of hostile offensive movements.” Prior to 6 August, only one ground patrol of the 24th Division intruded briefly on the enemy's side of the Nakdong, and aerial reconnaissance proved utterly inadequate to track an enemy who moved primarily at night and was a master at camouflage. This lapse aside, Church's defensive plan made the best possible use of the means available to accomplish his mission.<sup>2</sup>

On the night of 5—6 August 1950, elements of the North Korean 4th Division penetrated the front of the 24th Division in the sector defended by the 34th Infantry. This event precipitated the First Battle of the Nakdong Bulge, which from the American perspective consisted of a two-week series of counterattacks mounted to regain the original river line. During the fourteen days of battle, elements of the 24th Division, or units attached to it, attempted no less than sixty-one counterattacks of battalion or company size. Some of these were scheduled but never executed, while others were delivered only halfheartedly. Most failed to achieve the objectives set for them by the planning staffs. Yet, ultimately, the final counterattacks succeeded in crushing the North Korean 4th Division and regaining the 24th Division's original positions. What lessons, if any, can be drawn from the 24th Division's operations in the Nakdong Bulge? How relevant are these lessons for today's Army? The answers to these questions can be organized into two categories, the first dealing with counterattack and the second comprising more general observations on the conduct of the division's defensive battle.

In the section entitled “Conduct of the Defense,” the 1949 edition of FM 100—5 identified several key principles to be considered during the planning of a counterattack. First, the timing of such an attack was crucial to the success of an operation. If launched too soon, the counterattack might dissipate its force before the enemy's momentum was spent; if launched too late, the counterattack would be too weak to deprive a tenacious enemy of the advantage and terrain he had already gained. A second major consideration was the axis upon which the counterattack should be launched. According to the manual, the defender's response should be directed against the flank of the penetration if at all possible, rather than against the nose. Third, the manual emphasized the need for coordination of all elements committed to the counterattack mission. This coordination could only be achieved by establishing a single command structure with clearly defined authority over all participating components.<sup>3</sup>

A useful method of characterizing counterattacks is by time of delivery. In some armies, a unit driven from a position will attempt to regain the lost ground almost at once, before the enemy can organize the newly won terrain for defense. This type of counterattack is usually conducted by the original defenders without the assistance of significant reinforcements. For want of a better term, it can be classified as a hasty counterattack. The

German Army in World War II was noted for this type of response, and North Korean units often employed it in the First Battle of the Naktong Bulge. Examples are the North Korean counterattacks against the Marines on Obong-ni Ridge and against the 19th Infantry during the seizure of Ohang Hill. Units of the 24th Division almost never employed this tactic of hasty counterattack, the sole exception being the successful counterattack of the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, on 16 August.

Most of the 24th Division's counterattacks during the battle occurred many hours after the loss of the original position. Virtually all of these ripostes were based upon prior planning, either prebattle counterattack plans or plans devised after the enemy had made his gains. Such counterattacks can best be characterized as deliberate counterattacks, entailing significant amounts of planning time and elaborate efforts to coordinate both the actions of adjacent units and available supporting fires. Unfortunately, no matter how much planning and preparation time was available prior to H-hour, the 24th Division proved unable to mount a fully coordinated counterblow in which all elements jumped off at the appointed time. The reasons for this state of affairs varied widely: inability to obtain timely resupply, inadequate knowledge of the terrain, shortage of transportation, misreading of the tactical situation, and the debilitated condition of the assaulting units. Time after time, a unit would begin its assault on schedule, while a neighboring unit, which had a crucial role to play, did not. The invariable result was unnecessary casualties.

Besides being characterized as either hasty or deliberate, counterattacks may also vary in scope. Those with narrowly defined objectives, conducted by relatively small units, and lacking wide implications for the larger battle can be defined as local counterattacks. These often correspond to the hasty counterattack described above, although there are exceptions. Such counterattacks were seldom employed by the 24th Division. The operations of the 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, early on 6 August provide one example, and those of the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, on 16 August represent another. Counterattacks on a wider front, with larger numbers of participating units and with sector-wide implications, can be styled general counterattacks. During August 1950, this type of response became the normal method of operation for the 24th Division.

As the battle for the Naktong Bulge intensified and more units joined the fight, the task of coordinating the employment of forces available to the 24th Division became increasingly difficult. Gradually, a command and control system evolved to alleviate this problem, but the response could have been more rapid had the advice offered by FM 100-5 been adopted from the beginning. Initially, the enemy penetration was treated as a local problem to be handled by the 34th Infantry. When the regimental reserve proved inadequate to deal with the situation, General Church committed his division reserve, the 19th Infantry. This response, too, failed to erase the North Korean penetration and left the division without any reserve of its own. Fortunately, Eighth Army released a succession of units, beginning with the 9th Infantry, to assist the 24th Division. The three regimental

commanders—Beauchamp, Moore, and Hill—next conducted independently a series of general counterattacks. Their relatively unsuccessful efforts led Church to attempt coordination through the personal presence of the assistant division commander. This, too, failed to achieve the desired result. Finally, Church created Task Force Hill to impose order among the various units attempting to reduce the salient. This improved the planning process but seemed to have little effect upon battle performance, since by that time, most of the task force's components were too battle weary to respond coherently. During the final stage of the battle, the arrival of Brigadier General Craig's 1st Provisional Marine Brigade forced the dissolution of Task Force Hill. All units, thereafter, operated directly under division control, with coordination being arranged through the division operations officer at a forward CP at Yongsan. Air and artillery support for the final counterattacks were also coordinated from Yongsan.

Since the 24th Division's zone encompassed terrain and units some distance from the fighting raging in the Bulge, the division commander in the rear was hardly the man to guide the general counterattacks necessary to evict the North Koreans. The task force concept of a sole counterattack commander, as prescribed in the doctrinal manuals of the day, was sound and should have been implemented as soon as the initial counterattacks of 6 August had failed to regain the river line. Such a concept, however, was not employed for several days, during which time the counterattacking forces suffered significant reductions in their fighting power without commensurate gains of territory. By the time centralized command and control procedures were established, the counterattacking units had suffered heavy losses, and the North Koreans had begun to consolidate their position east of the Nakdong.<sup>4</sup>

No matter at what level the counterattacks were controlled, they tended to violate another significant principle emphasized in FM 100-5. According to the manual, counterattacks should generally be directed toward the flanks of a penetration, rather than the nose, in order to seal the break in the defensive line or, at worst, to prevent it from growing wider. Little effort was made by the 24th Division to do this during the battle. The initial counterattack on 6 August, that of Ayres' 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry, struck the North Korean drive head-on. It can be argued that this approach was necessary in order to place a blocking force in the path of an advancing enemy to buy time for later attacks on their flanks. Even if this point is conceded, Ayres' methods, involving inadequate security and incomplete knowledge of the enemy's location, temporarily wrecked his battalion and delayed the North Koreans only slightly. The afternoon counterattack by the 19th Infantry adhered to the doctrinal formula more closely and, indeed, established a firm shoulder north of the penetration that remained in place throughout the battle. Elsewhere, there was little effort to maneuver in accordance with doctrine.

Both postwar authors and participants in the conflict have commented upon the predilection of American units in Korea to tailor their maneuvers to the available road net and to avoid the generally trackless regions.<sup>5</sup>

Such a region existed in the Bulge south of the Yongsan-Naktong road. Throughout the battle, North Korean units maneuvered freely through this sector and ultimately used it to introduce units into the vulnerable rear of the 24th Division. In contrast, the few American units that operated in this region either remained passive, like Companies K and L, 34th Infantry, or were too small for the assignment given them, like the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry. Only one attempt was made to sweep around the North Koreans' southern flank through this rough terrain. The two rifle companies of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, were entirely too small a force to secure such a large area or even seriously to affect enemy operations. As it happened, they did not even make the effort, being overrun in their assembly area by a preemptive North Korean attack. After this abortive attempt to strike the North Korean penetration on its southern flank, no further operations occurred in the southern sector of the Bulge until the final mopping-up phase of the battle.

American operations against the North Korean penetration almost invariably took the form of frontal attacks against the enemy positions on the hills flanking the Yongsan-Naktong road. The major reinforcements received during this phase of the 24th Division's fight—the 9th Infantry and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade—were committed along this road. The battle thus degenerated into a series of vicious fights for hill masses in the center of the Bulge. North of the road, the 9th Infantry struggled to gain control of Maekkok Hill and Hill 165. South of the road, first the 34th Infantry and then the Marines fought similar battles for possession of Obong-ni Ridge. Both of these counterattack series, as well as those of the 19th Infantry around Ohang Hill, were simply frontal assaults. Whenever a new unit arrived to reinforce the 24th Division's general counterattack, it was committed near the Yongsan-Naktong road. No attempt was made to maneuver either the 9th Infantry or the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade around the North Korean southern flank. Instead, the road served both as a magnet and a funnel for American reinforcements. Drawn to the road because of their motorized transport, the American units were funneled along it to a point a mile and one-half beyond the village of Kang-ni, where they invariably established lines of departure north or south of the road and entered the battle. Unhampered by such a road fixation, the more agile North Koreans used the roadless area to the south to good advantage, sending units through it to sever the 24th Division's main supply route. The Americans' lack of imagination in their scheme of maneuver and their failure to employ existing doctrinal concepts cost them heavily in both lives and lost opportunities.

The defensive doctrine found in American manuals current in August 1950 was sound.<sup>6</sup> For a unit forced to defend on a wide front with inadequate numbers, a defensive scheme consisting of lightly held frontline positions backed by large counterattack reserves represented a viable solution to a difficult defensive problem. American counterattack doctrine also was sound, correctly identifying and emphasizing certain key elements necessary for success: good preliminary intelligence, timely commitment of reserves,

flank attacks, and unified command and control. The 24th Division, during the First Battle of the Naktong Bulge, regularly violated the first and third of these tenets and for a time neglected the fourth. It ultimately won the battle, but only with the assistance of most of Eighth Army's reserve formations. Rather than a battle of maneuver, the First Battle of the Naktong Bulge became a battle of attrition. In such a fight, the side with the largest reserves has a decided advantage. During the course of the battle, the 24th Division was reinforced at one time or another by six Army infantry battalions and a Marine brigade. In contrast, the North Korean 4th Division received no reinforcements of consequence. Had the 24th Division been more familiar with its own counterattack doctrine and employed it more rigorously, it might have been able to defeat the North Korean thrust without all of the assistance it ultimately required. Certainly, Eighth Army's reserves need not have been depleted so severely and so unnecessarily.

The First Battle of the Naktong Bulge is rich in lessons other than those involving counterattack. The battle exposed several flaws in the operations of the 24th Division's staff. Intelligence estimates of North Korean capabilities and intentions were extremely conservative. Even though sightings of enemy groups moving progressively around the division's left flank and into its rear were included in the intelligence summaries, no glimmer of what this meant is apparent in the estimates. Although notations on the sighting reports indicate they were posted on the daily situation map along with the division's own dispositions, no one seems to have noted the yawning gap on the division's left flank or that the North Koreans were exploiting it. Even an attack by infiltrators on an artillery battery some distance behind the front was disregarded. Only when North Korean units cut the division's MSR was any concern shown, and even then it was reported in the division war diary that the intruders must have passed through an adjacent division's sector. In fact, the North Korean 4th Division was simply following the same pattern of operations it had been using since the war's outbreak.<sup>7</sup> Even had the information of North Korean movement through the gap not been available, the lack of concern for an open flank would hardly have been excusable. With the information in their hands, the G2 and G3 sections were clearly negligent in failing to identify a serious threat to the MSR before the road actually was lost.

A possible explanation for the lapse in the 24th Division staff's understanding of the enemy's operations may be the fact that the division moved its headquarters from Ch'angnyong to Kyun'gyo during the most crucial phase of the North Korean turning movement. Ironically, this movement of headquarters was initiated because of a potential threat to the headquarters at Ch'angnyong from small bands of infiltrators. But instead of making the headquarters more secure, the move actually brought it into the path of a much larger North Korean force. Indicative of the division staff's misreading of the situation, this move disrupted operations of the division headquarters for at least twenty-four hours. In addition, locating the division CP at Kyun'gyo meant that all wire communications ran along the narrow road that served as the MSR. When that road was cut by the North

Koreans, so were all of General Church's ground communications links with forward units. As necessary as the movement of the division headquarters may have been, the time and manner in which it was accomplished materially aided the North Koreans by distracting the division staff and disrupting their routine. Modern division headquarters will have to move far more often than General Church's headquarters. The implications of even a relatively simple relocation such as Church's should be understood by modern planners as they contemplate even more rapid shifts of position.

The fluid conditions that prevailed on the 24th Division's left flank provided opportunities for both offensive and defensive rear area combat operations. Offensively, on two occasions, American units were in the rear or on the flank of North Korean units operating against the 24th Division's main defensive positions. Units of the 34th Infantry were involved both times—Companies A, C, and L on 6–8 August and Companies K and L on 10–13 August. Rather than aggressively attempt to disrupt North Korean resupply and troop movements, these units instead opted for passive defense of their enclaves, hoping thereby to remain inconspicuous until extracted. Self-preservation thus became paramount, taking precedence over inflicting maximum damage and discomfort upon the enemy. In the far more fluid situations envisioned for the modern battlefield, many more units will find themselves in positions similar to that of Captain Alfonso's two and one-half companies on the Naktong. How will they respond—aggressively as the manuals suggest or passively as did the men of the 24th Division?

Defensive operations in the rear of the 24th Division centered around protecting the MSR from Yongsan to Kyun'gyo and reopening it after the North Koreans closed the road. Initially, the situation at the front precluded detaching any combat units to deal with the threat to the MSR. This meant that units whose primary missions were noncombat were required to take up arms and defend the road. At the Yongsan end of the road, a company of engineers received the call, while at the Kyun'gyo end a far more heterogeneous organization was created ad hoc for the same purpose. Task Force Hafeman included soldiers from the division's headquarters company, MP company, ordnance maintenance company, and band, among others. Together with the engineers, Task Force Hafeman valiantly did its best to preserve the 24th Division's supply line until reinforcements could arrive. If nothing else, the operations on the MSR demonstrated that all units, no matter how far in the rear or how divorced from normal combat activity, should have a residual combat capability. As the 24th Division discovered in the Naktong Bulge, a combat unit may not always be available for rear area protection. In such situations, the personnel of the rear echelon must fend for themselves, and they should be prepared to do so.

The 24th Division's general performance in the First Battle of the Naktong Bulge and its relative lack of success is mitigated somewhat by the circumstances under which it went to war. No doctrine manuals provided guidance on how a tactical system predicated upon three maneuver elements per regiment and battalion could be made to function with only two.<sup>8</sup> Tactical fire support doctrine presupposed three firing batteries per artillery bat-

talion rather than the two per battalion that the 24th Division took to Korea. The manuals were silent on how to deal with an utterly inadequate supply of illuminating shells and mortar rounds. Personnel who had spent their careers in garrison were physically unprepared for hill climbing in the heat of a Korean summer or for the tempo of field operations against a tireless and resourceful enemy. All of these problems had solutions, some of them relatively simple ones, but in peacetime it had not seemed necessary to think about them. The crucible of war would eventually resolve these problems, but until the necessary thinking was done, men in units committed to the fight early, such as the 24th Division, would pay a heavy price for the Army's unpreparedness. Whenever the state of peacetime doctrine, war stocks, and unit conditioning is similar to that of 1950, a similar price will have to be paid.

More than thirty years have passed since the 24th Division stood on the defensive along the Nakdong River in Korea. Much has changed since then in terms of both technology and doctrine. Today, sensors detect an enemy's approach more easily than in 1950, and new communications gear is available to call down upon him far greater firepower in a much shorter time. Modern operations are also envisioned as being far more fluid than the relatively simple linear defensive scheme of the Pusan Perimeter, giving less meaning to such terms as "the rear." The current editions of FM 100-5 and supporting manuals give considerably less emphasis to topics like counter-attack than do the editions operative in 1950. No longer are the principles of timing, centralized command, and flank attacks so explicitly set forth.<sup>9</sup> Perhaps, today, these principles need not be drummed so heavily into the minds of officers. Perhaps that is indeed the case. The long history of warfare, however, and certainly the experience of the 24th Division in the Nakdong Bulge, presents evidence to the contrary.

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# Notes

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## Chapter 1

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9. Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, (June—November 1950)*, U.S. Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961), 180; Schnabel, *Policy*, 54; Weigley, *History*, 503—4; Mahon and Danysh, *Infantry*, 77.
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11. John W. Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 3d rev. ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), 89—90; Schnabel, *Policy*, 2—36; Appleman, *South*, 1—4.
12. Schnabel, *Policy*, 24—25, 36—39; Appleman, *South*, 5—12.
13. Appleman, *South*, 10—18; Schnabel, *Policy*, 38—40.
14. Appleman, *South*, 19—35, 52—55.

15. Ibid., 59; Schnabel, *Policy*, 41, 61—79.
16. Schnabel, *Policy*, 80n; Appleman, *South*, 50n, 59, 133, 180; William F. Dean, *General Dean's Story* (New York: Viking Press, 1954), 13.
17. Schnabel, *Policy*, 81, 82; Appleman, *South*, 59, 65—99, 122.
18. Appleman, *South*, 123—79. In every instance, North Korean operational concepts and tactics reflected the training the North Koreans had received from their Soviet mentors. For a good discussion of this, see Daniel S. Stelmach, "The Influence of Russian Armored Tactics on the North Korean Invasion of 1950" (Ph.D. dissertation, Saint Louis University, 1973), iv—v, 51—52, 122—27, 167—69, 252—54, 274—79.
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27. Appleman, *South*, 250, 254—55; Schnabel, *Policy*, 127.

## Chapter 2

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4. 24ID OIs, no. 17, 4 August 1950; 24ID WD, Narrative Summary; Appleman, *South*, 254.
5. 24ID WD, G-4 Journal, Daily Logistics Report no. 25, 051800 August 1950, Logistical Report no. 7, 6 August 1950 (data for 5 August 1950 taken from "Previously Short" column), Lieutenant Colonel Dixon to Lieutenant Colonel Sibert, 051915 August 1950, and Lieutenant Colonel Dixon to Lieutenant Colonel Witter, 042300 August 1950; 24ID WD, Engineer Officer Daily Diary, 5 August 1950; 24ID WD, Narrative Summary. The equipment shortages as of 5 August 1950 were based on the 24th Division's peacetime table of organization rather than on its authorized wartime strength.
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August 1950, and "Plan for Relief of 24th Inf. Div.," 4 August 1950; Schnabel, *Policy*, 127. Combat efficiency was a subjective assessment of a unit's capability, was usually expressed in percentages, and was recorded in a unit's Periodic Operations Report. It included a consideration of such factors as strength, morale, status of training, status of health, status of supplies and equipment, and length of time the unit had been in contact.

7. "34th Infantry Regiment Unit Reports," no. 23, 5 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 34IR URs); Appleman, *South*, 84, 147; Roy E. Appleman to Richard W. Stephens, 4 April 1952, in folder entitled "Correspondence 1952," Charles E. Beauchamp to Roy E. Appleman, 20 May 1953, in folder entitled "XVI. The First Battle of Naktong Bulge," and Roy E. Appleman to Charles E. Beauchamp, 25 May 1953, in folder entitled "Correspondence 1953," all in U.S. Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, Collection on *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (hereafter cited as OCMH Collection).
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- Period 23 July 1950 to 25 August 1950," 3—5 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Daily Diary, 3 August 1950, and Division Surgeon Staff Historical Report, 3 August 1950.
13. 24ID WD, G-4 Daily Diary, 4 August 1950, G-4 Journal, Daily Summary, 3—4 August 1950, and Quartermaster Daily Diary (Historical Report); "War Diary, 24th Medical Battalion," 5 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 24 Med Bn WD).
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  19. Appleman, *South*, 77; Ayres to Appleman, 5 June 1953, OCMH Collection.
  20. 24ID PIRs, no. 27, 072130 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 547, 070150 August 1950, and entry 553, 070555 August 1950; 21IR URs, no. 30, 071700 August 1950; 21IR S-3 Journal, 7 August 1950; 1/19 Narrative; Alfonso to Ayres, 27 November 1954, OCMH Collection.
  21. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 6-7 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 601, 061035 August 1950, and entry 615, 061125 August 1950; "Headquarters Second Infantry Division War Diary," 6 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 2ID WD); "Headquarters 2d [Infantry] Division Artillery War Diary," entry 34, 061130 August 1950; "War Diary, Headquarters Fifteenth Field Artillery Battalion," 6 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 15FA Bn WD); 24ID WD, G-4 Daily Diary, 6-7 August 1950.
  22. Alfonso to Appleman, 27 November 1954, OCMH Collection; 24ID WD, G-4 Journal, Daily Summary, 071800 August 1950, entry 18, 070310 August 1950, and entry 14, 071305 August 1950; 34IR WD, 7 August 1950; 34IR URs, no. 25, 071700 August 1950.
  23. 34IR WD, Summary and 7 August 1950; 34IR URs, no. 25, 071700 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 071320 August 1950 and 071355 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 565, 071030 August 1950, and entry 579, 071240 August 1950; 24th Recon Co WD, 7 August 1950. The 30 percent combat efficiency figure mentioned was based on a three-battalion regiment.
  24. 1/19 Narrative; 19IR UJ, 7 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 28, 071700 August 1950; 19IR WD, Summary; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 568, 071115 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 640, 070700 August 1950, and entry 646, 071115 August 1950.
  25. 1/19 Narrative; 19IR UJ, 7 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 29, 081700 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 646, 071115 August 1950, entry 656, 071200 August 1950, entry 658, 071455 August 1950, entry 662, 071830 August 1950, and entry 665, 072210 August 1950.
  26. 21IR S-3 Journal, 7 August 1950; 21IR WD, 7 August 1950; 21IR URs, no. 30, 071700 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-4 Journal, "Signal Supply, 24th Div.," 071800 August 1950; 14E(C) Bn WD, 7 August 1950. Company C, 14th Engineers, is listed in some documents as Company D.
  27. 21IR S-3 Journal, 7 August 1950; 21IR WD, Summary and 7 August 1950; 21IR URs, no. 30, 071700 August 1950, and no. 31, 081700 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 562, 071010 August 1950, entry 570, 071115 August 1950, and entry 599, 071610 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 661, 071725 August 1950.
  28. 21IR S-3 Journal, 7 August 1950; 21IR URs, no. 31, 081700 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 630, 072245 August 1950, and entry 635, 072312 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 666, 072230 August 1950.
  29. 3E(C) Bn WD, Narrative Summary and 7 August 1950; 21IR WD, 7 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-4 Daily Diary, 7 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 650, 071155 August 1950; 24ID PORs, no. 32, 072400 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 7 August 1950; 24th Recon Co WD, 7 August 1950; Co A, 78 Tk Bn WD, 7 August 1950.
  30. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 7 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Daily Diary, 7 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 538, 070005 August 1950, entry 548, 070230 August 1950, entry

571, 071130 August 1950, entry 580, 071240 August 1950, entry 620, 072100 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 654, 071350 August 1950, entry 664, 072020 August 1950, entry 667, 071943 August 1950, entry 668, 072325 August 1950; 21IR S-3 Journal, 7 August 1950.

31. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 7 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 644, 071055 August 1950; 21IR S-3 Journal, 7 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 071115 August 1950; 24ID PIRs, no. 27, 072130 August 1950.
32. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 7 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Daily Diary, 7 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 634, 062255 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-4 Journal, Daily Logistics Report no. 27, 071800 August 1950; 24ID PORs, no. 32, 072400 August 1950; 2ID WD, 7 August 1950; 24ID HQ Co WD, 7 August 1950; 24 Signal Co WD, 7 August 1950.

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1. 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 649, 080230 August 1950; 21IR WD, 8 August 1950; 21IR S-3 Journal, 8 August 1950; 21IR URs, no. 31, 081700 August 1950.
2. 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 663, 080700 August 1950; 15FA Bn WD, August 1950; 2ID Arty WD, 8 August 1950; Co A, 78 Tk Bn WD, 8 August 1950.
3. 24ID PIRs, no. 28, 082130 August 1950; 24ID WD, Narrative Summary, and Daily Diary, 8 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 661, 080630 August 1950, entry 664, 080710 August 1950, entry 666, 080730 August 1950, and entry 668, 080800 August 1950; 34IR URs, no. 26, 081700 August 1950; 34IR S-2 Journal, 8 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 8 August 1950; Alfonso to Ayres, 27 November 1954, OCMH Collection; 19IR URs, no. 29, 081700 August 1950.
4. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 8 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 709, 081719 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 680, 080330 August 1950, and entry 683, 080445 August 1950; 21IR URs, no. 31, 081700 August 1950; 21IR S-3 Journal, 8 August 1950; 3E (C) Bn WD, 8 August 1950.
5. 24ID WD OIs, no. 19, 082400 August 1950; 34IR WD, 8 August 1950; Alfonso to Ayres, 27 November 1954, OCMH Collection.
6. Co A, 78 Tk Bn WD, Narrative Summary, and 8 August 1950.
7. 19IR WD, 8 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 29, 081700 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 8 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 688, 080830 August 1950.
8. 24ID WD OIs, no. 19, 082400 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 685, 080720 August 1950, and entry 689, 081005 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 8 August 1950.
9. 19IR UJ, 8 August 1950; 1/19 Narrative; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 692, 081230 August 1950.
10. 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 675, 080115 August 1950, and entry 679, 080510 August 1950; Historical Section, G-2, HQ 2d Infantry Division, "The 2d Infantry Division and the Korean Campaign," vol. 1, "8 July 1950—31 August 1950," 28—29 (hereafter cited as 2ID, "Korean Campaign"); John G. Hill comments for Roy E. Appleman, 2 January 1958, Appleman Ms—External Review, OCMH Collection; 15FA Bn WD, August 1950.
11. 2ID, "Korean Campaign," 29; 9th Infantry Regiment Unit Reports, no. 1, 8 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 9IR URs); 9th Infantry Regiment Periodic Operations Reports, no. 12, 081800 August 1950, and no. 13, 082400 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 9IR PORs); 9th Infantry Regiment Operations Orders, no. 4, 081315 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 9IR OOs).
12. 2ID "Korean Campaign," 29—33; 9IR URs, no. 1, 8 August 1950; 9IR PORs, no. 13, 082400 August 1950, and no. 14, 090600 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 716, 081840

- August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 700, 081650 August 1950, and entry 701, 081815 August 1950; 19IR WD, Summary; 19IR UJ, 8 August 1950.
13. 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 688, 081150 August 1950, and entry 729, 082255 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 694, 081330 August 1950, and entry 696, 081435 August 1950; 21IR S-3 Journal, 8 August 1950.
  14. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 8 August 1950; 24ID PORs, no. 33, 082400 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-4 Journal, Daily Logistics Report no. 28, 081800 August 1950, Logistical Report no. 9, 8 August 1950, and entry 20, 080930 August 1950; 24ID WD, Ordnance Officer Daily Diary, 8 August 1950; "24th Replacement Company War Diary," 8 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 24 Repl Co WD); 9IR PORs, no. 13, 082400 August 1950.
  15. Ayres to Appleman, 5 June 1953, OCMH Collection; Alfonso to Ayres, 27 November 1954, OCMH Collection; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 781, 091545 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 732, 091400 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-4 Daily Diary, 8 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 9 August 1950; 34IR WD, 9-10 August 1950; 34IR URs, no. 27, 091700 August 1950.
  16. 34IR WD, 9 August 1950; 34IR URs, no. 27, 091700 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 9 August 1950; 34IR S-2 Journal, 9 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 815, 091545 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 725, 090730 August 1950, entry 732, 091400 August 1950, and entry 13, 091545 August 1950.
  17. 19IR UJ, 9 August 1950; 9IR PORs, no. 13, 082400 August 1950, and no. 14, 090600 August 1950.
  18. 24ID WD, Air Operations Reports, no. 7, 091700 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 9 August 1950; 21IR S-3 Journal, 9 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 755, 090950 August 1950, entry 758, 091030 August 1950, entry 760, 091055 August 1950, entry 763, 091020 August 1950, and entry 767, 091230 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 723, 090655 August 1950, entry 728, 090835 August 1950, and entry 731, 091210 August 1950; Co A, 78 Tk Bn WD, 9 August 1950; Hill comments for Appleman, 2 January 1958, OCMH Collection; 2ID, "Korean Campaign," 33; Clark C. Munroe, *The Second United States Infantry Division in Korea, 1950-1951* (Tokyo, Japan: Toppan Printing Co., 1952), 9. The 24ID WD Daily Diary entry for 9 August 1950 is especially misleading about the operations of the 9th and 19th Infantry regiments on the date in question.
  19. 2ID, "Korean Campaign," 33; Munroe, *Second Division*, 9-10; 34IR Message Journal, 9 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 9 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 30, 9 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 733, 090145 August 1950, and entry 779, 091435 August 1950.
  20. 1/19 Narrative.
  21. 21IR S-3 Journal, 9 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 736, 090430 August 1950, entry 759, 091045 August 1950, and entry 761, 091125 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 718, 090437 August 1950, entry 719, 090455 August 1950, entry 720, 090510 August 1950, and entry 722, 090600 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-4 Journal, entry 13, 091145 August 1950; 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 9 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Daily Diary, 9 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Daily Diary, 9 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-4 Daily Diary, 9 August 1950; 24ID PIRs no. 29, 092130 August 1950; "24th Military Police Company War Diary," 9 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 24 MP Co WD).
  22. 24ID HQ Co WD, 8-9 August 1950 [entry for 8 August 1950 is misdated]; 24 Signal Co WD, 9 August 1950; 24ID WD, Signal Officer Daily Diary, 9 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-1 Daily Diary, 9 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Daily Diary, 9 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Daily Diary, 9 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-4 Daily Diary, 9 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 796, 091800 August 1950, and entry 797, 091800 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 1, 091800 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-4 Journal, entry 1, 091801 August 1950.

23. 13FA Bn WD, 9 August 1950; 13FA Bn UJ, 8—9 August 1950; 24ID WD, Air Operations Reports, no. 7, 091700 August 1950.
24. 19IR UJ, 9 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 31, 101700 August 1950; 1/19 Narrative, 24ID WD, G-1 Daily Diary, 9 August 1950; Co A, 78 Tk Bn WD, 9 August 1950.
25. 9IR PORs, no. 15, 091800 August 1950, and no. 16, 092400 August 1950; 2ID, "Korean Campaign," 34—35; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 18, 092005 August 1950, and entry 41, 092330 August 1950.
26. 21IR S-3 Journal, 9 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 783, 091735 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 41, 092330 August 1950.
27. 19IR UJ, 9 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 794, 092150 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 33, 092227 August 1950; 24ID PIRs, no. 30, 102200 August 1950.
28. 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 41, 092330 August 1950; "34th Infantry Regiment S-1 Journal," 10 August 1950; 34IR WD, 10 August 1950.
29. 24ID WD, G-1 Daily Diary, 10—11 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Daily Diary, 9—10 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Daily Diary, 9—10 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-4 Daily Diary, 9—10 August 1950; 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 9 August 1950; 24ID PORs, no. 34, 092400 August 1950.
30. 19IR UJ, 9 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 794, 092150 August 1950, and unnumbered entry, 100400 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 33, 092227 August 1950; 21IR S-3 Journal, 10 August 1950.
31. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 9 August 1950; 24ID PORs, no. 34, 092400 August 1950; 24ID Arty WD, 10 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 10 August 1950.
32. 19IR UJ, 10 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 31, 101700 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 799, 100730 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 37, 100650 August 1950, and entry 57, 101050 August 1950; Appleman, *South*, 301n; 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 10 August 1950.
33. 2ID, "Korean Campaign," 35; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 798, 100633 August 1950, and entry 800, 100804 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 10 August 1950; 34IR URs, no. 28, 101700 August 1950.
34. 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 807, 101003 August 1950, and entry 816, 101145 August 1950; 34IR WD, 10—11 August 1950; 34IR URs, no. 28, 101700 August 1950; 9IR PORs, no. 18, 101800 August 1950; 2ID, "Korean Campaign," 35; Hill comments for Appleman, 2 January 1958, OCMH Collection.
35. 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 848, 101950 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Order of Battle Journal, entry 23, 111300 August 1950.
36. 24ID WD, G-2 Daily Diary, 10 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Daily Diary, 10 August 1950; 21IR UJ, 10 August 1950.
37. 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 20, 101340 August 1950; 21IR WD, 10 August 1950; 21IR URs, no. 33, 101700 August 1950; 21IR S-3 Journal, 10 August 1950.
38. 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 24, 101610 August 1950, entry 25, 101620 August 1950, and entry 26, 101600 August 1950; Gordon E. Murch comments for Roy E. Appleman, 7 April 1954, in folder entitled "XVI. The First Battle of Naktong Bulge," OCMH Collection.
39. 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 26, 101600 August 1950, entry 31, 101705 August 1950, and entry 32, 101715 August 1950; 34IR WD, 10 August 1950; 34IR URs, no. 28, 101700 August 1950; Beauchamp comments for Appleman, 20 May 1953, OCMH Collection; "Historical Report—August 1950, 27th Infantry Regt'l Combat Team," 2d Battalion Summary of Activities (hereafter cited as 27IRCT, "Historical Report").

40. 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 846, 101855 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 36, 101850 August 1950, entry 42, 101950 August 1950, and entry 43, 102000 August 1950.
41. 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 46, 102210 August 1950, and entry 50, 110430 August 1950; 24th Recon Co WD, Summary and 10 August 1950.
42. 27IRCT, "Historical Report," including 2d and 3d Battalions' Summaries of Activities, August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 44, 102030 August 1950, entry 49, 102200 August 1950, and entry 51, 110515 August 1950; Murch comments for Appleman, 7 April 1954, OCMH Collection.
43. 19IR UJ, 10 August 1950; 2ID, "Korean Campaign," 35; 9IR PORs, no. 18, 101800 August 1950, and no. 19, 102400 August 1950.
44. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 10 August 1950; 24ID PORs, no. 35, 102400 August 1950; 24ID WD OIs, no. 20, 102400 August 1950; John Church to Roy E. Appleman, 7 July 1953, in folder entitled "XVI. The First Battle of Naktong Bulge," OCMH Collection; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 43, 102000 August 1950.
45. Hill comments for Appleman, 2 January 1958, OCMH Collection; 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 10 August 1950.
46. 24ID WD, G-4 Journal, Daily Logistics Report no. 30, 101800 August 1950, and Logistical Report no. 11, 101840 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-4 Daily Diary, 10 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 22, 101410 August 1950; 24 Repl Co WD, 10 August 1950.
47. 24ID PIRs, no. 30, 102200 August 1950; 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 10 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-4 Journal, entry 15, 102357 August 1950.

## Chapter 5

1. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 10 August 1950; "19IR OOs, no. 6," 11 August 1950.
2. 27IR URs, 111800 August 1950; 27IRCT, "Historical Report," 2d Battalion Summary of Activities; Murch comments for Appleman, 7 April 1954, OCMH Collection; 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 11 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 63, 110900 August 1950, entry 71, 111115 August 1950, entry 77, 111155 August 1950, entry 80, 111215 August 1950, entry 81, 111300 August 1950, and entry 90, 111530 August 1950.
3. 24th Recon Co WD, 11 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 50, 110430 August 1950, entry 58, 110740 August 1950, entry 61, 110830 August 1950, entry 65, 110940 August 1950, entry 67, 111000 August 1950, and entry 68, 111000 August 1950.
4. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 11 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 70, 111040 August 1950, and entry 85, 111330 August 1950; 21IR S-3 Journal, 11 August 1950; 21IR URs, no. 34, 111700 August 1950; 24th Recon Co WD, 11 August 1950; Co A, 78 Tk Bn WD, Narrative Summary.
5. 24th Recon Co WD, 11 August 1950; 13FA Bn WD, 11 August 1950; 13FA Bn UJ, 11 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 904, 111350 August 1950; Btry A, 26AAA (AW) Bn WD, 11 August 1950.
6. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 11 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 85, 111330 August 1950; 34IR URs, no. 29, 111800 August 1950; 34IR WD, 11-12 August 1950; 19IR OOs, no. 6, 11 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 11 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 32, 111700 August 1950; 1/19 Narrative.
7. 24th Recon Co WD, 11 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 91, 111540 August 1950.
8. 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 96, 111755 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 921, 111845 August 1950; 13FA Bn WD, 11 August 1950; 13FA Bn UJ, 11 August 1950.
9. Munroe, *Second Division*, 9.

10. 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 99, 111905 August 1950; 21IR WD, 11 August 1950; 21IR URs, no. 35, 121700 August 1950; 21IR UJ, 11 August 1950; 14E(C) Bn WD, 11 August 1950, and Detailed Account of Operations, 11—13 August 1950.
11. 24th Recon Co WD, 11 August 1950; 14E(C) Bn WD, Detailed Account of Operations, 11—13 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 92, 111600 August 1950; 24ID HQ Co WD, 11—12 August 1950; 24ID WD, Ordnance Officer Daily Diary, 11 August 1950; 24th Infantry Division Band War Diary, 11 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 24ID Band WD).
12. 27IR URs, 121800 August 1950; 27IRCT, "Historical Report," August 1950, including 2d Battalion Summary of Activities.
13. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 11 August 1950; 24ID PORs, no. 36, 112400 August 1950; 27IRCT, "Historical Report," August 1950, including 3d Battalion Summary of Activities.
14. 24ID WD, Surgeon Daily Diary, 11 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Daily Diary, 11 August 1950; 24ID WD, Finance Officer Daily Diary, 11 August 1950.
15. 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 107, 112150 August 1950; 3E(C) Bn WD, Narrative Summary; 21IR S-3 Journal, 11 August 1950.
16. Army Map Service, series L751 (Korea, 1:50,000), type A (AMS-1), -1945, sheet 6920 III (Yongsan).
17. 24ID WD, Narrative Summary; 24ID WD, Signal Officer Daily Diary, 13 August 1950; 24ID PIRs, no. 32, 122030 August 1950.
18. 24th Recon Co WD, 12 August 1950; 14E(C) Bn WD, Detailed Account of Operations, 11—13 August 1950.
19. 24ID HQ Co WD, 12—13 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 129, 120900 August 1950; 724th Ordnance Maintenance Company War Diary, 12 August 1950; Btry A, 26AAA (AW) Bn WD, 12 August 1950; 24ID WD OIs, no. 21, 122400 August 1950.
20. 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 110, 120140 August 1950, and entry 129, 120900 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-4 Journal, entry 15, 102357 August 1950; 14E(C) Bn WD, Detailed Account of Operations, 11—13 August 1950.
21. 24 Med Bn WD, 12 August 1950; 14E(C) Bn WD, Detailed Account of Operations, 11—13 August 1950; 24th Recon Co WD, 12 August 1950.
22. 14E(C) Bn WD, Detailed Account of Operations, 11—13 August 1950.
23. 24ID HQ Co WD, 13 [12] August 1950.
24. 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 115, 120700 August 1950; 24th Recon Co WD, 12 August 1950; 14E(C) Bn WD, Detailed Account of Operations, 11—13 August 1950; 24ID Arty WD, 12 August 1950; 21IR S-3 Journal, 12 August 1950; 9IR URs, no. 5, 121800 August 1950.
25. 24th Recon Co WD, 12 August 1950; Appleman, *South*, 303n; Co A, 78 Tk Bn WD, 13 [12] August 1950.
26. 24ID HQ Co WD, 13 [12] August 1950; 24th Recon Co WD, 12 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 143, 121705 August 1950; 14E(C) Bn WD, Detailed Account of Operations, 11—13 August 1950. Hafeman's War Diary states that Post 1 was evacuated at 1600, but the preponderance of evidence suggests that the event occurred one hour later. The M-39 armored personnel carrier was an open-topped vehicle based upon the chassis of the World War II vintage M-18 tank destroyer. Christopher F. Foss, *Armoured Fighting Vehicles of the World* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), 149.
27. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 12 August 1950; 24ID HQ Co WD, 13 [12] August 1950; 24ID Band WD, 12 August 1950; 24 MP Co WD, 15 [12] August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 145, 121800 August 1950; 24ID WD, Ordnance Officer Daily Diary, 12 August 1950.

28. 14E(C) Bn WD, Detailed Account of Operations, 11–13 August 1950; 24th Recon Co WD, 12 August 1950; Co A, 78 Tk Bn WD, 13 [12] August 1950; 24ID PIRs, no. 32, 122030 August 1950.
29. 21IR S-3 Journal, 12 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-1 Daily Diary, 12 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Daily Diary, 12 August 1950; 24ID WD, Medical Officer Daily Diary, 12 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 123, 121030 August 1950, entry 126, 121305 August 1950, entry 132, 121300 August 1950, and entry 151, 121955 August 1950; 21IR URs, no. 36, 131700 August 1950; 24ID PIRs, no. 32, 122030 August 1950.
30. 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 121, 121015 August 1950, entry 130, 121355 August 1950, entry 133, 121245 August 1950, and entry 140, 121450 August 1950; 24ID WD, Public Information Officer Daily Diary, 12 August 1950; Church to Appleman, 7 July 1953, OCMH Collection; Appleman, *South*, 303; 24ID PORs, no. 37, 122400 August 1950. Appleman placed Hill's conference with Church and Walker on 13 August, but 24ID documents indicate that it occurred on 12 August.
31. 9IR URs, no. 5, 121800 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 33, 121800 August 1950; 34IR URs, no. 30, 12 August 1950; 1/19 Narrative; 19IR UJ, 12 August 1950; 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 12 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 948, 120600 August 1950, entry 951, 120720 August 1950, entry 954, 120835 August 1950, and entry 960, 121045 August 1950; 13FA Bn WD, 12 August 1950; 13FA Bn UJ, 12 August 1950; 21IR S-3 Journal, 12 August 1950.
32. 21IR S-3 Journal, 12 August 1950; 21IR WD, 12 August 1950; 21IR URs, no. 35, 121700 August 1950; 3E(C) Bn WD, 12 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 108, 120010 August 1950, entry 109, 120100 August 1950, entry 111, 120225 August 1950, entry 112, 120300 August 1950, entry 117, 120810 August 1950, entry 125, 121210 August 1950, entry 134, 121300 August 1950, entry 147, 121700 August 1950, entry 155, 122125 August 1950, and entry 156, 122045 August 1950.
33. 21IR S-3 Journal, 12 August 1950; 21IR WD, Summary, and 12 August 1950; 21IR URs, no. 35, 121700 August 1950, and no. 36, 131700 August 1950; 24ID WD, Engineer Officer Daily Diary, 12 August 1950; 52FA Bn WD, 12 August 1950.
34. 21IR URs, no. 35, 121700 August 1950.
35. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 12 August 1950; 27IRCT, "Historical Report," August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 153, 121740 August 1950, and entry 158, 122305 August 1950; 24ID PORs, no. 37, 122400 August 1950; 24ID WD OIs, no. 21, 122400 August 1950; "Headquarters, 23d Infantry, Narrative Summary of Command and Unit Historical Report, Period Covered, 1 August–31 August 1950."
36. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 13 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 213, 131605 August 1950, and entry 222, 131800 August 1950; 27IRCT, "Historical Report," August 1950, included 2d and 3d Battalions' Summary of Activities; 27IR URs, 131800 August 1950. In some accounts, the 3d Bn, 27IR is identified as the 3d Bn, 29IR, its designation prior to 6 August. Appleman, *South*, 253n.
37. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 13 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 174, 130600 August 1950, entry 181, 130818 August 1950, entry 203, 131334 August 1950, and entry 207, 131450 August 1950; William M. Glasgow, "Platoon Leader in Korea," Ms, Archives, Center of Military History, Washington, DC, 32–40.
38. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 13 August 1950; 27IRCT, "Historical Report," August 1950, including 2d and 3d Battalions' Summary of Activities; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1059, 132035 August 1950, and entry 1074, 132250 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 190, 131120 August 1950, and entry 223, 131620 August 1950; 24ID HQ Co WD, 14 [13] August 1950.
39. 21IR URs, no. 36, 131700 August 1950, and no. 37, 141700 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1066, 132120 August 1950; 21IR S-3 Journal, 13 August 1950; 3E(C) Bn WD, 13 August 1950.

40. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 13 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 224, 132000 August 1950, and entry 231, 132140 August 1950; 21IR WD, 13 August 1950; 21IR S-3 Journal, 13 August 1950; 21IR URs, no. 37, 141700 August 1950; 3E(C) Bn WD, 13 August 1950.
41. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 13 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 206, 131140 August 1950; 24ID PIRs, no. 33, 132030 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 13 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 34, 131700 August 1950; 1/19 Narrative.
42. 24ID WD, 13 August 1950; 9IR URs, no. 6, 131800 August 1950; 2ID, "Korean Campaign," 38; 19IR UJ, 13 August 1950.
43. 34IR WD, 13 August 1950; 34IR URs, no. 30, 131800 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 13 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 160, 130115 August 1950, entry 162, 130155 August 1950, entry 163, 130110 August 1950, entry 164, 120125 August 1950, entry 178, 130015 August 1950, entry 201, 130845 August 1950, entry 217, 131610 August 1950, and entry 226, 131040 August 1950.
44. 24th Recon Co WD, 13 August 1950; 14E(C) Bn WD, 13 August 1950; 14E(C) Bn, Detailed Account of Operations, 11–13 August 1950; Co A, 78 Tk Bn WD, 14 [13] August 1950.
45. 19IR UJ, 13 August 1950; 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 13 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 183, 130905 August 1950, and entry 197, 131242 August 1950; 9IR OOs, no. 5, 131300 August 1950, and Overlay to Accompany Operations Order no. 5; 24ID WD OIs, no. 22, 132400 August 1950.
46. 24ID WD, Signal Officer Daily Diary, 13 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-1 Daily Diary, 13 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-4 Daily Diary, 13 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-4 Journal, entry 3, 13 August 1950, and entry 22, 131800 August 1950; 24 Repl Co WD, 13 August 1950; 24ID PORs, no. 38, 132400 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 34, 131700 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Order of Battle Journal, entry 29; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1024, 130900 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 206, 131140 August 1950.

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1. 9IR OOs, no. 5, 131300 August 1950, and Overlay to Accompany Operations Order no. 5, 131230 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1030, 131150 August 1950, entry 1033, 131210 August 1950, and entry 1050, 131815 August 1950.
2. 19IR UJ, 15 August 1950; 1/19 Narrative; 34IR URs, no. 32, 141800 August 1950; Beauchamp comments for Appleman, 20 May 1953, OCMH Collection; Appleman, *South*, 306; 9IR URs, no. 7, 141800 August 1950; 9IR Os, no. 5, 131300 August 1950; 24ID Arty WD, 14 August 1950; 13FA Bn WD, 14 August 1950; 24ID WD, Air Operations Reports, no. 9, 142100 August 1950.
3. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 14 August 1950; Co A, 78 Tk Bn WD, 15 [14] August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 35, 141700 August 1950; 9IR URs, no. 7, 141800 August 1950; 34IR WD, 14 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 14 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 268, 140715 August 1950, entry 271, 140810 August 1950, and entry 273, 141006 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1098, 141235 August 1950.
4. 34IR WD, 14 August 1950; 34IR URs, no. 32, 141800 August 1950; 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 14 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 35, 141700 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 14 August 1950; Appleman, *South*, 306. See also Hill comments for Appleman, 2 January 1958, OCMH Collection.
5. 19IR UJ, 14 August 1950; 1/19 Narrative; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, 151015 August 1950.
6. 24ID WD, Air Operations Reports, no. 9, 142100 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1110, 141620 August 1950, entry 1112, 141645 August 1950, entry 1119, 141750 August 1950, and entry 1130, 142230 August 1950; 1/19 Narrative; 9IR URs, no. 7, 141800 August 1950; 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 14 August 1950; 34IR WD, 14 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 293, 141900 August 1950.

7. 21IR S-3 Journal, 9—11 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 14—15 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 36, 151700 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1134, 142222 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 319, 151015 August 1950.
8. 21IR WD, 14 August 1950; 21IR S-3 Journal, 14 August 1950; 21IR URs, no. 37, 141700 August 1950, and no. 38, 151700 August 1950; 14E(C) Bn WD, 14 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1146, 150030 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 242, 140030 August 1950, entry 248, 140300 August 1950, entry 249, 140315 August 1950, entry 287, 141320 August 1950, and entry 289, 141545 August 1950; 3E(C) Bn WD, 14 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-1 Daily Diary, 11 August 1950.
9. 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 258, 140530 August 1950, entry 259, 140535 August 1950, and entry 261, 140555 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 14 August 1950; Beauchamp comments for Appleman, 20 May 1953, OCMH Collection; 13FA Bn WD, 14 August 1950; 34IR WD, 14 August 1950; 34IR URs, no. 32, 141800 August 1950; 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 14 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1129, 142130 August 1950; 27IRCT "Historical Report," August 1950, including 2d and 3d Battalions' Summary of Activities; 24th Recon Co WD, 14 August 1950; 24ID PORs, no. 39, 142400 August 1950; 24ID WD OIs, no. 23, 142400 August 1950.
10. 34IR Message Journal, 14—15 August 1950; "34th Infantry Regiment Telephone Journal," 14 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 34IR Telephone Journal); 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 306, 150415 August 1950; Hill comments for Appleman, 2 January 1958, OCMH Collection.
11. 19IR UJ, 15 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1144, 150545 August 1950, and entry 1152, 150845 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 303, 150145 August 1950, entry 307, 150500 August 1950, and entry 309, 150810 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 15 August 1950; 21IR S-3 Journal, 15 August 1950; Munroe, *Second Division*, 10. The 3.5-inch rocket launcher had been hurriedly directed to the troops in Korea upon the discovery that the 2.36-inch rocket launcher already in their hands was inadequate to stop the North Korean T-34 tanks. Schnabel, *Policy*, 84.
12. 24ID WD, Air Operations Reports, no. 10, 152100 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 15 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 36, 151700 August 1950; 1/19 Narrative; 9IR URs, no. 8, 151800 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 15 August 1950; 34IR Telephone Journal, 15 August 1950; 34IR WD, 15 August 1950; 34IR URs, no. 33, 151800 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1152, 150845 August 1950, entry 1157, 151000 August 1950, and entry 1161, 151125 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 309, 150810 August 1950, and entry 310, 151030 August 1950. Air strikes numbered only eighteen on 15 August, compared to fifty-two on the previous day. For a detailed account of the actions of Company A, 34th Infantry, on 15 August, see Russell A. Gugeler, *Combat Actions in Korea* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1970), 20—30.
13. Appleman, *South*, 308; 24ID WD, G-4 Journal, entry 8, 150830 August 1950; 24th Quartermaster Company War Diary, 15 August 1950.
14. 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 315, 151130 August 1950; 9IR URs, no. 8, 151800 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 15 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 15 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1161, 151125 August 1950, entry 1171, 151330 August 1950, and entry 1204, 160050 August 1950; 24ID Arty WD, 14—15 August 1950.
15. 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 315, 151130 August 1950, entry 322, 151545 August 1950, entry 341, 151200 August 1950, and entry 343, 152245 August 1950; 21IR S-3 Journal, 15 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1185, 151830 August 1950; 3E(C) Bn WD, 15 August 1950; 21IR URs, no. 38, 151700 August 1950, and no. 39, 161700 August 1950; 24th Recon Co WD, 15 August 1950.
16. 24ID PIRs, no. 35, 152030 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1162, 151125 August 1950, entry 1163, 151155 August 1950, entry 1168, 151250 August 1950, and entry 1173, 151340 August 1950.

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1. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 16 August 1950.
2. 34IR WD, 16 August 1950; 34IR URs, 161800 August 1950; 13FA Bn WD, 16 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1213, 160650 August 1950, and entry 1223, 161045 August 1950.
3. 19IR URs, no. 37, 161700 August 1950; 19IR S-3 Journal, 16 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 350, 160730 August 1950, and entry 359, 160825 August 1950.
4. 9IR URs, no. 9, 161800 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1212, 160500 August 1950, entry 1218, 160830 August 1950, and entry 1221, 161000 August 1950; 2ID, "Korean Campaign," 39–40; Munroe, *Second Division*, 10.
5. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 16 August 1950; 21IR WD, 16 August 1950; 21IR URs, no. 39, 161700 August 1950, 21IR S-3 Journal, 16 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1234, 161322 August 1950, entry 1235, 161402 August 1950, and entry 1241, 161600 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 358, 161145 August 1950, entry 360, 161300 August 1950, and entry 366, 161530 August 1950.
6. 24th Infantry Division War Diary, Operational Directive, no. 1, 161400 August 1950 (hereafter cited as 24ID WD OD); 24ID PORs, no. 41, 162400 August 1950; 24ID WD OIs, no. 25, 162400 August 1950; 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 16 August 1950; 9IR URs, no. 9, 161800 August 1950.
7. 24ID WD OD, no. 1, 161400 August 1950; "1st Provisional Marine Brigade, Operation Plan 13–50," 161400 August 1950; 19IR OOs, no. 8, 16 August 1950; 34IR OOs, no. 8, 161800 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 372, 161550 August 1950.
8. Lynn Montross and Nicholas Canzona, *U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950–1953*, vol. 1, *The Pusan Perimeter* (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1954), 49–54, 103–56.
9. "1st Provisional Marine Brigade, Special Action Report, 2 August–6 September 1950: Operations with Eighth U.S. Army Korea": Basic Report; annex How, SAR, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, Co A, 1st Tk Bn, 5th Marines; annex Easy, Air Section Report; Montross and Canzona, *U.S. Marine Operations*, 1:175–77.
10. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: Basic Report; annex How, SAR, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, 1st Bn, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, 3d Bn, 5th Marines; 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, Periodic Operations Reports, no. 28, 161230 August 1950, no. 29, 170500 August 1950, no. 30, 170815 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-4 Daily Diary, 16 August 1950.
11. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, 3d Bn, 5th Marines; and 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 17 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 382, 170300 August 1950, entry 384, 170415 August 1950, and entry 405, 171230 August 1950; 34IR URs, 171800 August 1950; Montross and Canzona, *U.S. Marine Operations*, 1:176–78.
12. W. E. Sweeney to N. A. Canzona, 22 May 1954, correspondence file for *U.S. Marine Operations in Korea*, vol. 1, Washington National Records Center, National Archives; 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, 1st Bn, 5th Marines.
13. Sweeney to Canzona, 22 May 1954, and A. M. Zimmier to N. A. Canzona, 18 February 1954, correspondence file for *U.S. Marine Operations*; 1st Prov Mar Bde SAR: annex How, SAR, 2d Bn, 5th Marines; Montross and Canzona, *U.S. Marine Operations*, 1:178; Appleman, *South*, 312.
14. Montross and Canzona, *U.S. Marine Operations*, 1:176–78; R. L. Murray comments for N. A. Canzona, 20 March 1954, correspondence file for *U.S. Marine Operations*; Appleman,

*South*, 311—12. General Craig's opinion of the condition of the 9th Infantry was much higher than Colonel Murray's.

15. Montross and Canzona, *U.S. Marine Operations*, 1:178—79; 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, Co A, 1st Tk Bn, 5th Marines; annex Item, 1st Bn, 11th Marines; annex How, SAR, 2d Bn, 5th Marines.
16. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: Basic Report; annex How, SAR, 2d Bn, 5th Marines; annex Easy, Air Section Report; Sweeney to Canzona, 22 May 1954, correspondence file for *U.S. Marine Operations*; Appleman, *South*, 312.
17. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, 2d Bn, 5th Marines; Sweeney to Canzona, 22 May 1954, Zimmer to Canzona, 18 February 1954, R. T. Hanifin Jr. to N. A. Canzona, 14 July 1954, all in correspondence file for *U.S. Marine Operations*; 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 17 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 389, 170935 August 1950, entry 393, 171030 August 1950, and entry 398, 171115 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 17 August 1950.
18. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 2d Bn, 5th Marines; Sweeney to Canzona, 22 May 1954, Zimmer to Canzona, 18 February 1954, and Hanifin to Canzona, 14 July 1954, all in correspondence file for *U.S. Marine Operations*; 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, Co A, 1st Tk Bn; annex Easy, Air Section Report. An extended account of the 2d Battalion's action can be found in Montross and Canzona, *U.S. Marine Operations*, 1:181—86. See also Andrew Geer, *The New Breed: The Story of the U.S. Marines in Korea* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), 60—68.
19. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 2d Bn, 5th Marines; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 398, 171115 August 1950; N. A. Canzona to R. L. Murray, 11 March 1954, correspondence file for *U.S. Marine Operations*; Montross and Canzona, *U.S. Marine Operations*, 1:186—87. Apparently, General Craig was able to reach Colonel Hill before Murray did, since the 9th Infantry began its advance before Murray's 1st Battalion attacked.
20. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: Basic Report; annex How, SAR, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, 1st Bn, 5th Marines; 1st Prov Mar Bde, PORs, no. 31, 172039 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 410, 171525 August 1950; F. I. Fenton Jr. to N. A. Canzona, 8 May 1954, and N. A. Canzona interview with J. R. Stevens and G. C. Fox, 24 February 1954, both in correspondence file for *U.S. Marine Operations*.
21. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 17 August 1950; 9IR URs, no. 10, 171800 August 1950; 34IR Telephone Journal, 17 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 17 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 17 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 420, 171950 August 1950.
22. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: Basic Report; annex How, SAR, Anti-Tk Co, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, Co A, 1st Tk Bn; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1332, 172010 August 1950.
23. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 1st Bn, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, Anti-Tk Co, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, Co A, 1st Tk Bn; 1st Prov Mar Bde, Special Report, Destruction of Enemy Tanks, 23 August 1950; 1st Prov Mar Bde, PORs, no. 32, 172359 August 1950; 2ID, "Korean Campaign," 40; Munroe, *Second Division*, 10.
24. 34IR WD, 17 August 1950; 34IR URs, 171800 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 17 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 405, 171230 August 1950; 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 17 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 38, 171700 August 1950.
25. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 17 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 38, 171700 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 17 August 1950; 21IR S-3 Journal, 17 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 17 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 387, 170845 August 1950, and entry 418, 171626 August 1950; 1/19 Narrative.
26. 1/19 Narrative; 19IR UJ, 17 August 1950.

27. 1/19 Narrative; 19IR UJ, 17 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 17 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 38, 171700 August 1950.
28. 21IR WD, 17 August 1950; 21IR URs, no. 40 and annex I, 171700 August 1950; 21IR S-3 Journal, 17 August 1950; 24th Recon Co WD, 17 August 1950; 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 17 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1274, 170500 August 1950, entry 1286, 170900 August 1950, entry 1309, 171400 August 1950, and entry 1329, 171840 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 394, 171045 August 1950, entry 397, 171025 August 1950, entry 406, 171350 August 1950, and entry 431, 172235 August 1950; Glasgow, "Platoon Leader," 51-55.
29. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 17 August 1950; 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 2d Bn, 5th Marines; 9IR URs, no. 10, 171800 August 1950; 1/19 Narrative.
30. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 17 August 1950; 24ID WD, Signal Officer Daily Diary, 17 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Daily Diary, 17 August 1950; 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex Easy, Air Section Report; 24ID PIRs, no. 37, 172040 August 1950; 24ID WD, OIs, no. 26, 172400 August 1950.
31. 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1365, 180415 August 1950, entry 1373, 180910 August 1950, entry 1383, 181045 August 1950, and entry 1446, 181517 August 1950; 9IR URs, no. 11, 181800 August 1950; 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, 1st Bn, 5th Marines; N. A. Canzona interview with J. R. Stevens and G. C. Fox, 24 February 1954, in correspondence file for *U.S. Marine Operations*; Montross and Canzona, *U.S. Marine Operations*, 1:196-200.
32. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 1st Bn, 5th Marines; annex Easy, Air Section Report; Canzona interview with Stevens and Fox, 24 February 1954, in correspondence file for *U.S. Marine Operations*; Montross and Canzona, *U.S. Marine Operations*, 1:200-201; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 455, 181040 August 1950.
33. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, 3d Bn, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, Co A, 1st Tk Bn; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 461, 181300 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 18 August 1950.
34. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, Co A, 1st Tk Bn; 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 18 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1398, 181340 August 1950, and entry 1402, 181315 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 462, 181340 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 18 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 18 August 1950.
35. 9IR URs, no. 11, 181800 August 1950; 34IR WD, 18 August 1950; 34IR URs, 181800 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 18 August 1950; 24ID WD OIs, no. 26, 172400 August 1950.
36. 34IR WD, 18 August 1950; 34IR URs, 181800 August 1950; Beauchamp comments for Appleman, 20 May 1953, OCMH Collection; 21IR S-3 Journal, 18 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 18 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1371, 180845 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 446, 180839 August 1950, entry 450, 180848 August 1950, and entry 453, 180820 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 18 August 1950; 34IR Telephone Journal, 18 August 1950.
37. 34IR Message Journal, 18 August 1950; 34IR Telephone Journal, 18 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 38, 181800 August 1950; 1/19 Narrative; 19IR UJ, 18 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 449, 181005 August 1950, and entry 456, 181000 August 1950.
38. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 2d Bn, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, Co A, 1st Tk Bn; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1411, 181510 August 1950; 34IR WD, 18 August 1950; 34IR URs, 181800 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 18 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 38, 181800 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 18 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 509, 18 August 1950.

39. 34IR Message Journal, 18 August 1950; 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 3d Bn, 5th Marines; 1st Prov Mar Bde PORs, no. 34, 182100 August 1950, and no. 35, 190013 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1430, 182115 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 474, 181900 August 1950.
40. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 18 August 1950; 34IR WD, Summary and 18 August 1950; 34IR URs, 181800 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 18 August 1950; 34IR Telephone Journal, 18 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 469, 181700 August 1950, entry 473, 181840 August 1950, and entry 478, 182100 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1451, 190100 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 38, 181800 August 1950, and no. 39, 191800 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 18 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-4 Daily Diary, 18 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-4 Journal, entry 3, 181845 August 1950; 24ID WD, Air Operations Reports, no. 13, 182100 August 1950. Approximately 5,185 pounds of cargo were dropped to the 19th Infantry, but some of it landed in the 34th Infantry's sector and was retained by the latter unit without authorization.
41. 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 18 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1416, 181715 August 1950, entry 1417, 18 August 1950, and entry 1434, 182150 August 1950; 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex Easy, Air Section Report; 24ID Arty WD, 18 August 1950; 13FA Bn WD, 18 August 1950; 13FA Bn UJ, 18 August 1950; 24ID WD OIs, no. 27, 18 August 1950; 21IR WD, 18 August 1950; 21IR URs, no. 41, 181700 August 1950, and no. 42, 191700 August 1950; 21IR S-3 Journal, 18 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 448, 180950 August 1950, and entry 477, 182030 August 1950; Glasgow, "Platoon Leader," 56-64.
42. 24ID Arty WD, 18 August 1950; 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 18 August 1950; 24ID PORs, no. 43, 182400 August 1950; 24ID WD OIs, no. 27, 18 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 467, 181500 August 1950, and entry 513, 181930 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 18 August 1950; 2d ID, "Korean Campaign," 40. Movement of the 9th Infantry and 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, had already begun late in the afternoon.
43. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, 3d Bn, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, Co A, 1st Tk Bn; 1st Prov Mar Bde, Periodic Logistic Reports, no. 18, 191800 August 1950, and no. 19, 202000 August 1950; 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 19 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1483, 191355 August 1950, entry 1485, 191500 August 1950, and entry 1505, 192020 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 503, 190645 August 1950, entry 504, 190700 August 1950, and entry 505, 190703 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-4 Daily Diary, 19 August 1950; 34IR WD, 19 August 1950; 34IR Message Journal, 19 August 1950.
44. 34IR WD, 19 August 1950; 34IR URs, 191800 August 1950; 19IR URs, no. 39, 191800 August 1950; 19IR UJ, 19 August 1950; 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: annex How, SAR, 5th Marines; annex How, SAR, 3d Bn, 5th Marines; 9IR URs, no. 12, 191800 August 1950; 2ID, "Korean Campaign," 40-41; 24ID WD, G-2 Journal, entry 1457, 190820 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 507, 190925 August 1950, and entry 508, 191010 August 1950; 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 19 August 1950; 24ID WD OIs, no. 28, 191800 August 1950; 24ID PORs, no. 44, 192400 August 1950.
45. 1st Prov Mar Bde, SAR: Basic Report; annex How, SAR, 5th Marines; 24ID WD, Daily Diary, 20-25 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-3 Journal, entry 511, 191130 August 1950.
46. 24ID WD, Quartermaster Daily Diary, Historical Report, 23 July-27 August 1950; 24ID WD, Chaplain Daily Diary, 23 August 1950; 24ID WD, G-4 Journal, entry 8, 23 August 1950. The number of American casualties in the First Battle of the Naktong Bulge is virtually impossible to determine with certainty because of the delay in discovering the fate of those originally listed as missing in action. Division records show the following casualty figures for the period 5-19 August 1950: killed in action, 71; wounded in action, 535; missing in action, 563; nonbattle casualties, 161. Obviously, when the division reoccupied its original positions along the Naktong after the battle, the numbers in the killed in action and missing in action categories changed markedly but to what degree cannot now be determined. "24th Infantry Division Periodic Personnel Reports," nos. 4-6, 5-29

August 1950. Marine casualties were: killed in action, 66; wounded in action, 278; missing in action, 1. Montross and Canzona, *U.S. Marine Operations*, 1:206. North Korean casualties in the battle are unknown but were extremely heavy. The 4th North Korean Division was virtually destroyed, with American troops burying at least 1,200 enemy dead. Appleman, *South*, 317—18.

47. General accounts of the Second Battle of the Naktong Bulge can be found in Appleman, *South*, 443—70; Montross and Canzona, *U.S. Marine Operations*, 1:207—37; Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War*, 204—29. For the 24th Division's role in the breakout, see Appleman, *South*, 554—58.

## Chapter 8

1. In the context of this study, the term light infantry is defined as an infantry formation operating with virtually no armor support, reduced artillery support, and reduced vehicular support. It is not intended to suggest that the 24th Division either was trained in or fought in accordance with classic light infantry tactics.
  2. FM 100—5 (August 1949), 140—42.
  3. Ibid., 147—55.
  4. This aspect of counterattack doctrine was reaffirmed in U.S. Army War College, *Report of Conference of Commandants of Army Service Schools*, 29 January—1 February 1951, vol. 1, 48—49.
  5. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War*, 154—55; Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, "Training Bulletin no. 1," 8 September 1950, 16—17; 24ID WD, Summary, 23 July—25 August 1950.
  6. This was the conclusion of Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, "Training Bulletin no. 1," 15, and U.S. Army War College, *Report of Conference*, 1:33—35.
  7. The North Korean 4th Division's usual tactics had been to fix the defenders in front while outflanking them to left or right. During the campaign south from Osan, the defenders' left flank had been the flank most often turned.
  8. Army practice was to skeletonize its infantry units by removing a battalion from each regiment, while the Marines chose to remove a company from each battalion. In neither case were doctrinal adjustments made to address the new situation. No evidence exists to indicate that either method was markedly superior to the other. The only difference seems to have been the echelon that was required to deal with the problem.
  9. See U.S. Department of the Army, FM 100—5, *Operations* (Washington, DC, August 1982), 10—5 and 11—8, for the modern view of counterattack. The principle of timing receives the most attention. Flank attacks are recommended, but the manual emphasizes fire more than maneuver in such situations. The principle of centralized command of all counterattack elements seems to have been dropped. Lower level manuals show a similar trend. For example, see U.S. Department of the Army, FM 7—20, *The Infantry Battalion* (Washington, DC, March 1950), 315—25, and U.S. Department of the Army, FM 7—20, *The Infantry Battalion* (Washington, DC, April 1978), 5—36 to 5—40.
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## *Note on Sources*

Counterattack on the Naktong is based primarily on official documents created by the 24th Infantry Division during or shortly after the First Battle of the Naktong Bulge in August 1950. Housed in the Washington National Record Center of the National Archives and Records Service, Suitland, Maryland, these documents generally consist of war diaries, staff section journals, unit journals, unit reports, periodic operation reports, operations instructions, telephone logs, and map overlays. In addition to the official records of the 24th Infantry Division, a few records of component units of the 2d Infantry Division and the 25th Infantry Division have been used. These documents are also at the Suitland repository. All of the U.S. Army records are now under the custody and control of the National Archives and Records Service. Official records of the 1st Provisional Brigade, U.S. Marine Corps, while housed at Suitland remain under the control of the Historical Branch, U.S.M.C., which must grant permission for their use.

Supplementing the official documents as a source for this paper are correspondence, notes, and interviews generated as a result of the writing of the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps official histories of this portion of the Korean War. Roy Appleman's files relating to *South to the Naktong*, *North to the Yalu* are housed in the National Archives and Records Service building in downtown Washington, D.C. Similar files for Lynn Montross and Nicholas Canzona's *The Pusan Perimeter* are in the Suitland facility mentioned above.

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## LEAVENWORTH PAPERS

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1. *The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946—76*, by Major Robert A. Doughty
2. *Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939*, by Dr. Edward J. Drea
3. *"Not War But Like War:" The American Intervention in Lebanon*, by Dr. Roger J. Spiller
4. *The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War*, by Captain Timothy T. Lupfer
5. *Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies*, by Dr. Allen F. Chew
6. *Soviet Night Operations*, by Major Claude R. Sasso
7. *August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria*, by Lieutenant Colonel David M. Glantz
8. *August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945*, by Lieutenant Colonel David M. Glantz
9. *Defending the Driniumor: Covering Force Operations in New Guinea, 1944*, by Dr. Edward J. Drea
10. *Chemical Warfare in World War I: The American Experience, 1917—1918*, by Major(P) Charles E. Heller, USAR
11. *Rangers: Selected Combat Operations in World War II*, by Dr. Michael J. King
12. *Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II*, by Dr. Christopher R. Gabel
13. *Counterattack on the Naktong, 1950*, by Dr. William Glenn Robertson

## RESEARCH SURVEYS

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1. *Amicide: The Problem of Friendly Fire in Modern War*, by Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Shrader
2. *Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine and Organization*, by Captain Jonathan M. House
3. *Rapid Deployment Logistics: Lebanon, 1958*, by Lieutenant Colonel Gary H. Wade
4. *The Soviet Airborne Experience*, by Lieutenant Colonel David M. Glantz

## STUDIES IN PROGRESS

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*Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine  
on the Russian Front During World War II*



*Tactics and Doctrine in Imperial Russia*



*U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965*



*Dragon Rouge: Hostage Rescue in the Congo*



*Light Infantry in Modern Historical Perspective*



*Abu-Ageila and Um Katef: History and Battle Planning*



*Counter guerrilla Operations: Nicaragua, 1927—33*



*World War II Corps Commander's Profile*



*Evolution of the Corps*




*World War II Eastern Front Atlas*



*Peacekeeping Operations*



*Mobilization-Related Correlates of Success  
in American World War II Infantry Divisions*



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## **COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE**

### *Missions*

The Combat Studies Institute was established on 18 June 1979 as a department-level activity within the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. CSI has the following missions:

1. Conduct research on historical topics pertinent to doctrinal concerns of the Army and publish the results in a variety of formats for the Active Army and Reserve Components.
2. Prepare and present instruction in military history at USACGSC and assist other USACGSC departments in integrating military history into their instruction.
3. Serve as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's executive agent for the development and coordination of an integrated, progressive program of military history instruction in the TRADOC service school system.



### SYNOPSIS OF LEAVENWORTH PAPER 13

This *Leavenworth Paper* examines both the theory and practice of U.S. Army counterattack doctrine at the outbreak of the Korean War. Through an analysis of the Army's manuals in effect in 1950, it establishes the importance of counterattack in defensive operations and identifies the general principles to be observed in mounting successful counterattacks. The paper then employs a case study to determine the application of counterattack doctrine in the field and to test the validity of that doctrine.

The case study chosen for examination is the First Battle of the Naktong Bulge, 6—19 August 1950, a part of the defense of the Pusan Perimeter. In this battle, the North Korean 4th Infantry Division crossed the Naktong River and penetrated deeply into the sector held by the U.S. 24th Infantry Division. Depleted by peacetime budget cuts and recent heavy combat, the 24th Infantry Division counterattacked to regain its original defensive positions along the river. When the division proved incapable of restoring its front alone, elements of two additional Army divisions and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade joined the counterattack force. Thus augmented, the 24th Infantry Division ultimately repulsed the North Koreans and re-established its original front.

During the two-week period covered by this study, the 24th Infantry Division and its attached units attempted at least sixty-one counterattacks of company size or larger. Analysis of these operations shows that the U.S. Army's counterattack doctrine was generally sound, but that significant elements of that doctrine were not followed by the 24th Infantry Division during the battle. This failure to implement valid doctrinal concepts appears both to have delayed the ultimate victory and increased its cost. Although the study is rich in other lessons as well, its findings regarding counterattack doctrine remain its central theme.

